analysis,” so well described by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, is a compulsion not only of those who deny the direct justiciability of Article 26. 53. Having made these considerations, one could argue—and this topic will be developed in the concurring opinion—that the direct justiciability of ESCER is consolidated in the case law of the Court and an integral part of the common language of the IAHRS. This is the chapter of the chain novel where I think the Court should continue writing the story of the application of human rights on the American continent, as there is no significant change in society, change to current law, or change in the understanding in the democracies of the continent of the content of the Convention that would justify a hermeneutic step backwards. 54. Once again, it is essential to remember that the Court’s past case law is not simply the idiosyncratic work of its judges, but also an inextricable part of the corpus of the Convention itself. The conventional norm, from this perspective, cannot be confused with its text. Rather, it must be objectively represented as the result of a process of interpretation and application. 55. Therefore, when implementing their obligations under this instrument, not only must signatory states take into account the wording of the Convention, they must also incorporate the concrete and settled interpretations of it made by this Court, in accordance with the paradigmatic precedent established in Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile.43 The states parties themselves incorporate the meanings that the Court attributes to the Convention in guiding their domestic judicial bodies in the application of the Convention, and therefore, a sudden and unjustified change in the approach to the effectiveness of ESCER is unjustified. 56. Dismantling the meaning of the justiciability of ESCER would, in this regard, have unexpected and troubling effects on not only this Court’s capacity to enforce overall compliance with the Convention and promote the unity and indivisibility of human rights, but also in the sense of threatening the integrity of the precedents set in national courts that enter into dialogue with the body of case law of the Court for guidance and to give consistence to what it means to enjoy human rights before the domestic jurisdiction. 57. In view of the ideal of legal certainty and foreseeability grounded in the values protected by the Convention, the new judges must therefore join the aforementioned and ongoing chain novel, whose imperative of integrity means that each new composition of this Court cannot make an original and unique interpretation of the Convention at a whim. Every new composition of the Court cannot simply overturn the foundations of application of the Convention, because human rights cannot be realized if the hermeneutics are allowed to vary at a whim. 58. Naturally, in view of the plasticity of law, the dynamics of and changes to international jurisdiction where the Convention is applied and the changing collective requirements of the peoples under that jurisdiction, a certain degree of judicial discretion must be maintained so new judges can update the Convention in the light of new disputes and new phenomena, thereby preventing the fossilization of interAmerican human rights law. However, on the pretext of updating the meaning of the “living Convention,” it is not permissible to undermine transgenerational unity. 59. Lastly, in setting the parameters of this "novel" that the current composition must continue, Dworkin points out that, "A judge's duty is to interpret the legal Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 124. 43 11