undeniable and omnipresent dependence of rights (of whatever nature) on the active behavior of the state and the provision of fiscal resources for their realization: “If rights were merely immunities from public interference, the highest virtue of government (so far as the exercise of rights was concerned) would be paralysis or disability. But a disabled state cannot protect personal liberties, even those that seem wholey “negative”, such as the right against being tortured by police officers and prison guards. A state cannot arrange prompt visits to jail and prisons by taxpayer-salaried doctors, prepared to submit credible evidence at trial, cannot effectively protect the incarcerated against tortures and beatings. All rights are costly because all rights presuppose taxpayer funding or effective supervisory machinery for monitoring and enforcement”.78 125. Naturally, as far as the approach to providing any right collectively, it is usually more complex, since it involves allocating economic resources that compete with each other in a democratic state and developing medium- and long-term public policies. 126. However, in the particular case that is now before the Court, respect for Mr. Guevara Díaz’s right to work by the State of Costa Rica did not require any especially onerous positive provision. Rather, it was simply a question of refraining from interfering in the work the victim was already doing on a provisional basis and that would have become permanent if the outcome of the competitive hiring process had been respected. 127. By failing to select Mr. Guevara Díaz and, consequently, removing him from his job, the state has violated the victim's right to work in its most fundamental sense, in addition to having curtailed the right to participate in the government. 128. I would recall that, in accordance with the international instruments cited by the judgment,79 the State of Costa Rica has ratified the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ILO Convention No. 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, and the ILO Convention No. 159 on Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (persons with disabilities), demonstrating that this state recognizes its mandate as the principle guarantor of the rights of persons with disabilities. 129. Specifically with regard to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, an instrument to which the inter-American states have widely adhered80 and whose article 27 provides a valuable contribution with regard to labor guarantees for persons with disabilities, it should be noted that its paragraph “g” refers to the obligation to “Employ persons with disabilities in the public sector.” This is a direct and clear mandate, which cannot be mistaken for an abstract command simply encouraging the hiring of persons with disabilities. It therefore amounts to the highest degree of state responsibility with respect to the right to work of this social group. 130. Under these obligations that fall to the state subject to their jurisdiction, the logic of a job selection process should be the reverse of what prevailed in the present case: the fact that a person qualified for the position has a disability should be a SUNSTEIN, Cass; HOLMES, Stephen. The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999, p.44. 78 79 Judgment, para. 51, 52, and 67. Year of ratification by some of the states party to the Convention: Brazil (2008), Uruguay (2009), Argentina (2008), Chile (2008), Paraguay (2008), Bolivia (2009), Peru (2008), Ecuador (2008), Colombia (2011), Venezuela (2013), Honduras (2008), Mexico (2007), Nicaragua (2007). 80 23