members of that family, and in particular of Mr. A.A. In our view, this also constitutes evidence showing that the State, at the very least, should have known about the situation of special vulnerability facing this human rights defender; about the fact that he had been declared a victim in another proceeding before this Court; and that he was trying to ensure compliance with the Judgment. 8. Thirdly, on November 26, 2003, a little more than a year prior to the date of A.A.’s death, his daughter B.A. filed a complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office of Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa. In the complaint she stated that a former kaibil who had ideological differences with her family had called her and threatened that he was going to harm her and her son. She added that this person had threatened her sister on a previous occasion. 13 The majority of the Inter-American Court considered that the absence of an express reference to the father in the complaint implied that there was not sufficient evidence to assert that the State should have known of the danger to his life. It reinforced its position by noting that B.A. had signed, and therefore had endorsed, the content of that complaint. 14 9. We consider that this interpretation by the Court is excessively formalistic. As this Court has pointed out, in an international tribunal whose purpose is the protection of human rights, the proceedings are endowed with special characteristics that distinguish it from proceedings of domestic law. Although it is less formal and more flexible that the latter, it must still ensure legal certainty and the procedural balance of the parties. 15 Thus, in this specific case, all the evidence should have been assessed as a whole, in light of the context of vulnerability that affected human rights defenders at the time of the events. 10. With respect to the aforementioned complaint of November 2003, the Court notes that: (i) both the plaintiff B.A. and her father A.A. were involved in defending economic, social and cultural rights in their community at the time of the events, and were also seeking justice for the forced disappearance of a family member; (ii) both were identified as members of a “subversive” family; (iii) both held positions of public influence at the time of Mr. A.A.’s death (Secretary and Mayor of the Community Development Council of the village of Cruce de la Esperanza, respectively); and (iv) the threat made in November 2003 referred precisely to the election of the Education Committee (COEDUCA) of the “Republic of Mexico” Community Self-Management School, where B.A. worked alongside her father and of which Mr. A.A. had previously been President. 16 Indeed, given the context of the case, it seems reasonable to conclude that the threat, made by a former kaibil, was not only directed against her and her son, but also against her father. 11. In the fourth place, we should not overlook the fact that the former Municipal Mayor of Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa was aware of the threats made against A.A. In a statement made on December 5, 2010, the Mayor expressly recognized that “[A.A.] was one of the community leaders threatened,” 17 since “his knowledge of human development and his work methodology, characterized by promoting community unity and seeking advice from professionals in various disciplines of science, was accepted and produced satisfaction in the community, because of the works achieved under his leadership, but it caused a lot of discontent and anger among leadership figures whose 13 Cf. para. 91 of the Judgment. 14 Cf. para. 146 of the Judgment. 15 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 42, and Case of Ríos et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 194, para. 95. 16 Cf. paras. 84 and 91 of the Judgment. 17 Para. 147 of the Judgment. 3