on amparo was adopted when a democratic government had been reinstalled and the authorities had guarantees of judicial independence. 88. Finally, it claimed that, while at the time of the dismissals, there were rules that barred the filing of writs of amparo and of administrative claims, they had not been an impediment for some former employees who filed remedies provided by the State and that, in any case, that norm was derogated and measures for the review of the dismissals and the reparation of those found irregular had been adopted and, therefore, the State was not responsible for the violation of Article 2 of the Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 89. The Court has pointed out that, pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Convention, “every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal,” which includes presenting arguments and providing evidence. The Court has indicated that this provision implies that “the decision produced by the judicial proceedings satisfies the result for which it was conceived.” This does not mean that the arguments of the claimants must be accepted, “but rather its ability to produce the result for which it was conceived be ensured.”61 90. With respect to Article 25(1), the Court has stated that this norm includes an obligation for States Parties to ensure to all persons under their jurisdiction access to an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights. This effectiveness presupposes that, in addition to the formal existence of remedies, those remedies provide results or responses to the violations of the rights contemplated in the Convention, the constitution or by law.62 Those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even for the particular circumstances of a case, are illusory cannot be considered effective. This occurs, for example, when their inadequacy has been demonstrated in practice due to a lack of means to execute decisions or for any other situation that gives rise to a context of denial of justice.63 This does not imply that the effectiveness of a remedy be evaluated as to whether it produces a favorable result to the complainant,64 but rather in light of its appropriateness and effectiveness to deal with eventual violations.65 B.1 The application to the present case of the considerations in Aguado Alfaro et al. and Canales Huapaya et al. and the alleged violation of Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention 91. The Court notes that the dismissed employees in this case, as well as the three victims in Canales Huapaya et al. and the 257 victims in Aguado Alfaro et al.: (i) were employees of the Peruvian Congress at the time of the so-called “Government of National Emergency and Reconstruction” and (ii) were collectively dismissed under the so-called “streamlining of Cf. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234. para. 122 and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of October 6, 2020. Series C No. 412, para. 131. 61 62 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, paras. 62 and 63 and Case of Habbal et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 108. 63 Cf. Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 4, 2011. Series C No. 223, para. 75 and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 130. 64 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 67 and Case of Habbal et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 112. 65 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2003. Series C No. 103, para. 117 and Case of Habbal et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 108. 25