Law 25640 of 1992, had established the inappropriateness of the writ of amparo to directly or indirectly contest its application.71 95. The State also maintained that the alleged victims could present a class action, but, as indicated in the chapter on preliminary objections (supra para. 33), this was not an appropriate remedy for their individual claims. The State also pointed out that, despite the express prohibition, some individuals presented writs of amparo, which demonstrates that it was possible to access this recourse to protect their rights. The Court, however, considers that the mere existence of the prohibition means that the dismissed employees could not be required to file that remedy. This, added to the context of the denial of justice, signifies that amparo was not an effective judicial remedy, which results in a violation of Article 25(1) of the Convention. B.1.b) Situation of the alleged victims who filed a writ of amparo 96. In this case, 20 alleged victims filed a writ of amparo to contest their dismissal, which was resolved after November 2000 when democratic order was restored in Peru.72 The State maintains that this demonstrates that its authorities had guarantees of judicial independence and that the 20 persons did have access to an effective judicial remedy and, thus, there was no violation in those cases. 97. Nonetheless, while the writ of amparo was formally admitted, it was not an effective remedy since the judges did not analyze the merits of the arguments of the alleged victims. The judges of the first and second instances declared the writ of amparo inadmissible, arguing that it was not the appropriate remedy to resolve the claims of the alleged victims because it lacked an evidentiary stage. In turn, on September 10, 2001, the Second Specialized Court of Public Law held that it was a “remedy with a very rapid procedure, without an evidentiary stage, which consists only of the juridical reasoning and logic of the operator of justice, who can only reestablish the right that has been violated.”73 98. For its part, the Constitutional Court, in resolving the special remedy that appealed the decision of the second instance, confirmed the decision but maintained that “in promulgating the Constitution of 1993, the organic structure of the Congress and, therefore, its Allocation of Personnel Table substantially changed” so that amparo could not restore the status quo ante the violation: Given that in promulgating the Constitution of 1993, the organic structure of the Congress and, therefore, its Allocation of Personnel Table substantially changed, it is not possible [,] by means of amparo to restore the status quo ante, therefore it has become irreparable […]. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court, using the attributions conferred upon it by the Constitution of Peru and its organic law CONFIRMS the appeal, and, by confirming the appeal, declares the writ of amparo INADMISSIBLE.74 (emphasis added) Article 9 of Decree-Law 25640 of 1992, which authorized the Administrative Commission to implement a streamlining of personnel process, established that “a writ of amparo to contest, directly or indirectly, the application of this Decree-Law is inadmissible” (evidence file, f. 2910). This norm was derogated by Law 27487 of June 23, 2001, which, in turn, derogated “the express norms that authorized collective dismissals under the process of reorganization” (evidence file, f. 2517). 71 72 The so-called “Government of transition” in Perú was in place between November 22, 2000 and July 28, 2001. 73 2443). Cf. Decision of the Second Specialized Court in Public Law of September 10, 2001 (evidence file, f. 74 Cf. Decision of the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court of December 6, 2002 (evidence file, fs. 332 al 333). 27