99. In other words, the Constitutional Court recognized that there was a violation of the rights of the claimants and yet declared the writ of amparo inadmissible. Amparo was, thus, not an effective remedy to protect the dismissed employees from an act that violated their rights, in violation of Article 25(1) of the Convention. 100. The right to judicial guarantees presupposes that a controversy be resolved within a reasonable period, since a prolonged delay may constitute, per se, a violation of judicial guarantees. The Court has also established that the assessment of a reasonable period should be analyzed in each specific case in relation to the total duration of the proceedings, including the remedies that may be filed.75 The four elements to analyze whether the guarantee of a reasonable period has been complied with are:(i) the complexity of the case, (ii) the procedural activity of the interested party, (iii) the conduct of the judicial authorities, and (iv) the harm to the juridical situation of the alleged victim.76 In this case, the writ of amparo was filed on March 17, 1993 and the decisions of the first and second instances were adopted on September 10, 200177 and June 18, 2002,78 respectively. In addition, a special remedy was filed against the decision of the second instance, which was resolved on December 6, 2002.79 This indicates that the remedy of amparo was resolved after the restoration of democracy. Nonetheless, it occurred eight years after the filing, which demonstrates that the alleged victims were not heard within a reasonable period, nor did they have access to a prompt remedy for the protection of their rights. 101. The Court finds that a delay of more than eight years in processing a constitutional remedy that the same judicial authorities qualified as very rapid and that did not admit evidence surpasses any period that could be considered reasonable and, thus, violates Article 8(1) of the Convention and, therefore, the Court does not consider it necessary to analyze each of the elements identified in its case law to establish the violation of this guarantee. In any case, it should be emphasized that this matter is not very complex in that the decision of the second instance and that which resolved the special remedy were adopted in a period of 15 months and the record does not indicate the existence of any conduct of the claimants that would have delayed the proceedings. 102. Therefore, the Court holds that, with respect to the 20 persons who filed a writ of amparo, there was a violation of Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention. The excessive delay in the administration of justice is additional evidence of the context of denial of justice, the ineffectiveness of the judicial institutions and the lack of judicial guarantees in Peru at the time of the facts. B.2 Duty to adopt provisions of domestic law 103. The Court has established that, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, States not only have a positive obligation to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the exercise Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 71 and Case of Sales Pimenta v. Brazil, supra, para. 107. 75 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, para. 78 and Case of Sales Pimenta v. Brazil, supra, para. 107. 76 77 Cf. Decision of the Second Specialized Court of Public Law of September 10, 2001. File No. 2972-01. Writ of Amparo (evidence file, fs. 2439 to 2447). Cf. Resolution No 11 of the Fifth Civil Chamber, Superior Court of Lima of June 18, 2002 (evidence file, f. 13). 78 Cf. Decision of the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court of December 6, 2002 (evidence file, fs. 330 to 334) 79 28