person's will. Either through verbal consent, or because said consent is derived from behavior that is evidently identifiable with voluntary participation. 146. The importance of the role of consent in situations of sexual violence is also justified based on the high incidence of cases in which sexual abuse occurs when the relationships between victim and aggressor are permeated by power asymmetries, which allow the aggressor to subdue the victim through acts committed in the institutional, work, or school environment, and through economic deprivation, among others.275 As the CEVI warns, often in these situations, there is no physical violence and the victim does not explicitly refuse, “but the rape occurs because consent is assumed in situations of unequal power.”276 According to the CEVI: In recent years, the concept of consent has been used as an exoneration from criminal liability to avoid investigations related to crimes committed against women, adolescents and girls for gender reasons, which has allowed, together with other circumstances, a high range of impunity for crimes against sexual freedom in the Americas and the Caribbean. This is because the legal conceptualization of the concept in Criminal Codes, is conceived from a vision where violence is only conceived through the exercise of force and physical violence, which generates a limited vision of what free choice of the exercise of a sexual act represents.277 147. The Court understands that there are situations in which defects in consent occur and recognizes that the lack of a legal definition of psychological violence, for example, hinders the possibility of investigating rape. In this regard, in line with General Recommendation No. 3 of the CEVI, the Court considers it essential that States include in their criminal regulations some elements to determine the absence of consent in a sexual act, such as (a) the use of force or the threat of its use; (b) coercion or fear of violence or its consequences;278 (c) intimidation; (d) detention and/or deprivation of liberty; (e) psychological oppression; (f) abuse of power, and (g) failure to understand sexual violence.279 148. The Court considers it necessary that criminal law also establish that consent cannot be inferred (i) when force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment has diminished the victim's ability to give a free and voluntary consent; (ii) when the victim is unable to give free consent; (iii) the victim's silence or lack of resistance to sexual violence, and (iv) when there is a power relationship that forces the victim to carry out the act for fear of its consequences, taking advantage of an environment of coercion.280 149. The Court considers that it is essential that the regulations concerning crimes of sexual violence provide that consent cannot be inferred, but must always be offered expressly, freely and prior to the act and that it can be reversible.281 By virtue of this premise, as this Court has already pointed out, in the face of “any type of coercive circumstance it is no longer necessary for the concept of consent to occur because that circumstance has, without a doubt, eliminated consent.”282 150. Regarding the sub judice case, as has been indicated, the crimes of rape and statutory rape were used during the criminal proceedings followed as a result of the sexual violence perpetrated against Brisa. At the date of the events, as previously mentioned, the crime of rape, provided for in 275 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, pp. 6 to 10. 276 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, p. 10. 277 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, p. 25. “Sexual coercion is any type of pressure that is exerted on someone to oblige them to perform a sexual act against their will; They include fear, intimidation, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power.” Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, p. 26. 278 279 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, pp. 26 to 28. 280 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, pp. 31 to 32. 281 Cf. Committee of Experts of the MESECVI, General Recommendation No. 3, supra, p. 44. In the Case of J. v. Peru, the Court recognized that “the circumstances in which the acts occurred eliminate any possibility that there was consent.” See: para. 360. 282 49