asserted that “child trafficking is a common practice Argentina” and that “in this specific case, it is evident that child trafficking has resulted in the violation of different human rights of [M and her father] recognized in the international instruments, which reveals the State’s failure to comply with its obligations.” They added that the facts of this case “confirm the complicity of the judicial agents with a child trafficking network that operated in Rosario del Tala and with those who appropriated [M].” The State considered that any statement tending to identify the facts of the case as situations related to the trafficking or the “sale” of children was inappropriate. Argentina denied the representatives allegations concerning a supposed “general situation […] tolerated by the State apparatus” or the existence of a “massive and systematic practice of child-trafficking […], or that the case was in any way similar to the illegal appropriation and substitution of identify of children that took place under the criminal plans of the last military dictatorship in Argentina.” 19. When determining the facts in the Merits Report, the Commission did not indicate the existence of a habitual or systematic practice of the sale or “trafficking of children” in Argentina; these facts were only described by the representatives. In addition, the representatives did not argue that these facts were designed to “explain, clarify or reject” the facts that had been mentioned in Report No. 83/10. According to the above-mentioned criteria, the Court will not consider the facts alleged by the representatives that are not part of the Commission’s Merits Report, or that do not explain, clarify or reject the facts presented by the Commission. Consequently, the alleged existence of a general situation or systematic practice of the trafficking or sale of children in Argentina does not form part of the factual framework of this case and, therefore, the Court will not consider the arguments related to those aspects. VI RIGHTS TO JUDICIAL GUARANTEES, TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION, TO PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY AND OBLIGATION TO ADOPT DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS, IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND GUARANTEE RIGHTS, AND TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD A. Facts 20. Before establishing the proven facts, the Court recalls that, according to Article 41(3) of the Rules of Procedure, it may consider accepted the facts that have not been expressly denied and the claims that have not been expressly contested. In this case, the State has not contested the facts that are considered proven in the following paragraphs. 21. On June 16, 2000, M, the daughter of Diana Elizabeth Enríquez and Mr. Fornerón was born in the Victoria Polyclinic Hospital. The two adults had a relationship that ended before the child was born. Mr. Fornerón was unaware of the existence of the pregnancy of Ms. Enríquez until approximately the fifth month, when a mutual friend told him about it. After he knew about the pregnancy, Mr. Fornerón asked Ms. Enríquez several times if he was the father and each time she denied this. The birth of M was registered by the mother on June 20, 2000. At the time of the facts, both Mr. Fornerón and the mother of the child lived in Rosario del Tala, a city about 100 milometers from Victoria.16 22. The day after the birth, Ms. Enríquez surrendered her daughter to the couple B-Z, 16 Cf. Testimony of Olga Acevedo rendered before notary public on October 4, 2011 (merits file, tome II, folios 1140 and 1141); birth certificate of M dated June 20, 2000 (file of attachments to the Merits Report, attachment 5, folio 47), and statement by Mr. Fornerón during the public hearing on October 11, 2011. 8