5 indigenous persons also violates Article 13 of the American Convention, which protects the right to freedom of thought and expression. B. Position of the State 20. Suriname acknowledges the judgment of the Inter-American Court in the Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, but argues that pending this process of recognition, restrictions of the property rights of indigenous peoples do not constitute per se violations of the indigenous peoples’ rights under other articles of the American Convention. Such restrictions, Suriname contends, may be permissible if done in accordance with the framework laid out in Inter-American jurisprudence. 21. As a preliminary matter, Suriname argues that most of the acts the alleged victims complain of took place before November 12, 1987, when Suriname ratified the American Convention, so it cannot be liable for alleged violations derived from those acts. It argues that the Wia Wia, Galibi, and Wane Kreek Nature Reserves were all established before it ratified the American Convention, and that the procedural requirement of consultation with indigenous peoples cannot be applied retroactively. Suriname similarly submits that the individual titles and mining concessions were granted before its ratification of the American Convention, and that this instrument cannot be applied retroactively either with respect to these acts. Suriname recognizes the existence of the doctrine of “continuous effects,” but it argues that whether the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples were actually consulted when the Nature Reserves were established, or when the individual titles and mining concessions were issued, is not legally relevant to determine alleged violations of the American Convention, particularly Article 21. Rather, it claims that the analysis should be whether any of the three challenged actions (i.e., issuance of individual titles, granting of mining concessions, and creation of Nature Reserves) has continuous effects on the petitioners that may amount a violation of the Convention. 22. Suriname then adds that there are no continuous effects with respect to the existence of the Nature Reserves, claiming that there is no de jure expropriation because they were established pursuant to the 1954 Nature Protection Act, and there is no de facto interference because the State’s stewardship of the Reserves respects the rights of the Kaliña and Lokono in accordance with their customs and traditions. Similarly, Suriname maintains that the individual titles issued to non-resident holders of vacation homes do not impair the traditional use of the land and its resources by the alleged victims. As for the mining activities, the State denies that they have any detrimental effect on the petitioners, and to the extent they have any effect, it is minimal and does not rise to the level of a violation of the American Convention. With respect to recognition of the victim’s property rights, Suriname takes the position that the property rights of indigenous peoples exist independently of their recognition by the State, and that therefore certain restrictions on that right may be permissible pending formal recognition of the right under domestic law. The State considers that, pending this recognition, it can be held responsible for violations of Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention, but that this does not necessarily mean it is also responsible for violating Article 21 thereof. 23. 24. The State argues that the petitioners’ claims related to Article 21 are unsubstantiated based upon four main grounds. First, the State argues that the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples are not a homogenous group and that their relationships with the territory are not identical among the varying groups inhabiting the area. Secondly, the State argues that Suriname’s actions of establishing Nature Reserves and issuing concessions for mining within the traditional Kaliña and Lokono territory are permissible restrictions on the alleged property rights of the Lower Marowijne