Jury. However, Argentina pointed out that it was the petitioner himself who undermined the effectiveness of the REF by failing to comply with the requirement of duly accrediting said alleged violations, inasmuch as this was a requirement of admissibility of the remedy itself in light of the jurisprudence in force. The State concluded that it is not possible to attribute liability for the violation of Article 25(1) of the Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 88. The Court has indicated that Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes the obligation of the States Parties to ensure, to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights.58 This effectiveness supposes that, in addition to the formal existence of the remedy, it leads to results or responses to the violation of the rights recognized in either the Convention, or their Constitution and laws. The Court has established that for an effective remedy to exist, it is not sufficient that it exists formally. This means that the remedy should be appropriate to contest the violation and that its application by the competent authority be effective. This does not mean that the Court assesses the effectiveness of a remedy based on whether it has produced a favorable result for the plaintiff.59 89. In the present case, neither the Commission nor the representatives presented allegations or evidence to argue that the REN, the REF, and the Motion for reconsideration were inadequate to correct this type of legal situation in the abstract. They presented arguments related to alleged violations in the specific case of Mr. Rico. The Commission acknowledged that the decisions of Impeachment Juries are subject to appeal, but that in the present case this could not have been done because no violations of due process were proven. Likewise, the State, at the request of this Court, submitted, together with its brief of final written arguments, judgments in which the REF was effective to appeal the decisions of the Impeachment Jury (supra para. 24). Consequently, this Court will not rule in the abstract on the adequacy of these remedies to appeal such decisions, but will only do so with respect to the decisions related to Mr. Rico. 90. Mr. Rico filed several appeals to challenge the decision against him by the Impeachment Jury (supra para. 33). On July 6, 2000, he filed a REN before the SCJBA, on September 22, 2000, a Federal extraordinary appeal before the SCJBA, and on February 7, 2001, a motion for reconsideration of dismissal of appeal before the CSJN (supra paras. 34 to 38). 91. In the first appeal, Mr. Rico argued that the principle of legality and due process guarantees were violated by framing the facts into the hypotheses provided in Law 8085; the unconstitutionality of the sanction of ineligibility to hold another judicial office and the denial of testimonies. In the second appeal, he reiterated that the decision of the Impeachment Jury violated due process and referred to the unconstitutionality of Article 45 of Law 8085, which denies the possibility of review of the rulings of Impeachment juries. In the third appeal before the CSJN, Mr. Rico indicated that the SCJBA committed a violation by denying the extraordinary appeal and that decisions of the Impeachment Jury are non-appealable. He also reiterated his request for unconstitutionality of Article 45 of Law 8085 and reiterated that he suffered a series of due process violations, such as the refusal to accept evidence on his behalf. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, para. 91, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador, para. 101. 59 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, para. 24, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, para. 67, and Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala, para. 169. 58 -22-