Jorge, fall within the crime of illicit drug trafficking, which is being heard in proceedings at the Specialized Criminal Court of Juanjuí, especially as regards to the drug-trafficking flights […].”95 It then indicated that the acts committed by Rosadio Villavicencio constituted the crime of failure to obey a lawful order “[…] due to non-compliance with the instructions given by the Command to the military personnel that provided services in those emergency areas […].”96 Notwithstanding the foregoing, non-compliance with those instructions precisely consisted of authorizing the flights to transport drugs. This demonstrates that the insubordination corresponded in substance with the fact that was being investigated in the ordinary jurisdiction, which falls under the ordinary legal classification of illicit drug trafficking. 101. The Court notes that when the same act or behavior is prohibited by of two or more rules underlying legal classifications it continues to be a single act, since all acts are human behaviors and a single offense must receive a single penalty. This is precisely what occurs in this case, a single act attributed to Mr. Rosadio Villavicencio, the authorization of drug-trafficking flights, falls into two different legal classifications: failure to obey a lawful order and illegal drug trafficking. Typically, a twofold classification of the same facts presumes that two different offenses were committed, which can in turn be sanctioned with two different penalties; this starts from the flawed assumption that there are two different acts, which would enable the multiple and unending chain of punishments that is prohibited by substantive criminal law, due to the splitting of the same facts into as many crimes as there are applicable legal classifications. 102. Though redundant, it is worth noting that for purposes of determining whether there was a single act, it is inconsequential that different juridical rights were infringed, precisely because offenses do not multiply the acts. In this case, the existence of a single act is a reality that cannot be denied by any legal interpretation. There are multiple examples of ideal concurrence in which the legal classifications that overlap in a single act require the infringement of different juridical rights: it is common for courts to decide on cases where there is an ideal concurrence of theft with physical violence and injuries, damages to property and physical integrity, but this does not permit splitting what ontically constitutes a single act, with a single decision of intent and sometimes even a single movement (the thief pulls on a handbag, which makes the victim lose balance, fall and injure him or herself). 103. It is worth reiterating that dividing up the offenses to match the number of overlapping legal classifications disregards the reality of the physical world, since it splits up a single act with several legal classifications into as many acts as there are possible legal classifications. This “law,” by ignoring the necessary ontic basis that links it to the real world, would attribute to itself the power to create an inexistent reality, thus agreeing with the philosopher Antisthenes, who claimed that “a white racehorse is in fact two horses,” to which Plato fittingly responded: “it still is one horse.”97 Pursuant to the Convention, dividing up a single act, or seeking to punish as many offenses as there are possible legal classifications, is incompatible with the requirement of “acts or omissions” set forth in Article 9 of the Convention. 104. It is worth noting that, apart from the reasons provided above, the requirement established in Article 9 is a clear rejection of all substantive criminal law with strong authoritarian tendencies. In fact, considering that there are as many crimes as there are infringed laws would mean punishing according to the number of breached mandates; that is, it would obey the number of “failures to obey a lawful order” and not the unlawful acts of its inhabitants, because crimes would not be actions but failures to comply with State mandates. This is the method whereby –in more authoritarian and totalitarian versions of substantive criminal law– the requirement of infringement of a juridical right is suppressed, since the “failure to obey a lawful order” of State mandates takes precedence. This does not preclude an act from having multiple legal 95 96 97 Judgment No. 025-97, Case No. 1594-0648, of December 15, 1997 (evidence file, folio 146). Judgment No. 025-97, Case No. 1594-0648, of December 15, 1997 (evidence file, folio 146). N. Abbagnano. Historia de la filosofía (Montaner y Simón, Barcelona, 1973), Vol. I, p. 68. 25