because they were unfounded and untrue. It added that the presumed victim had insisted on making public allegations against Mr. Willian Lara, former President of the National Assembly. 89. Venezuela pointed out that Mr. Lara had set aside his status as a public official to take legal action as a private citizen, in defense of his honor and reputation. It emphasized that in his legal action he decided not to invoke the criminal laws that protect the dignity of public servants. On the contrary, he brought a case for criminal defamation applicable among private parties. 90. The State also affirmed that the constitutional amparo action filed by Tulio Álvarez was admitted on November 25, 2009, by the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. The State recalled that the alleged victim has participated as a voter in electoral processes, exercising with full freedom his right to vote. This shows that he was free from any legal restriction that would prevent him for standing as a candidate for public office. B. Considerations of the Court 91. In this section the Court will examine pertinent points of law related to the alleged violation of Mr. Tulio Álvarez Ramos’ right to freedom of thought and expression. This analysis considers the consequences of the criminal case brought against him by the former congressman and President of the National Assembly of Venezuela, Willian Lara, for the offense of ongoing aggravated defamation, following the publication of an opinion column in the newspaper “Así es la Noticia”, in which Mr. Álvarez referred to the alleged diversion of funds from the Savings Bank of the Workers, Employees, Retirees and Pensioners of the National Assembly (supra para. 36). 92. The Court will now analyze the matter in the following order: (1) content of the right to freedom of thought and of expression; (2) permitted restrictions to the freedom of expression and the application of subsequent liability, and (3) the case of Mr. Álvarez Ramos. B.1. Content of the right to freedom of thought and expression 93. The right to freedom of thought and expression is established in Article 13 of the Convention. Likewise, Article 4 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the interpretative instrument of the OAS Charter and of the Convention itself, considers it an essential component of democracy.97 94. With regard to the right to freedom of thought and expression, the Court has previously indicated that those protected by the Convention not only have the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, but also to receive and be informed about information and ideas imparted by others.98 For this reason, freedom of expression has an individual dimension and a social dimension: [i]t requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily limited or impeded in expressing his own thoughts. In that sense, it is a right that belongs to each individual. Its second aspect, on the other hand, implies a collective right to Article 4 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: “Transparency in government activities, probity, and responsible public administration on the part of governments respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy.” 98 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008, Series C, No. 177, para. 53. 97 19