for imprisonment or fulfill the same purposes thereof, which can occur if these continue to be applied when the procedural risks that they seek to prevent have ceased to exist. Otherwise, the application of a precautionary measure that affects a defendant’s personal freedom and right to movement would be equivalent to anticipating a sanction prior to delivering the judgment, which contradicts the universally recognized general principles of law. 165 176. Moreover, any restriction of the right to leave the country imposed as a precautionary measure in a criminal trial should be necessary and proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued, so that it is applied only if no other less restrictive mechanism exists and during the time strictly necessary to fulfill its purpose, in this case to prevent Mr. Álvarez’s alleged flight. 177. In order to determine the necessity and proportionality of the restriction of freedom of movement, it is necessary to establish whether the decision ordering that measure was based on a reasonable argument that would justify its adoption. When analyzing the application of this type of measure, the judicial authorities must base their decisions on objective elements that indicate that the procedural dangers that they seek to prevent can effectively materialize.166 178. In this case, the measure restricting the defendant’s movement outside country was ordered by the Seventh Trial Court at the request of the plaintiff, using as justification one of the grounds for pre-trial detention, namely, that the defendant was a flight risk (supra para. 43). However, the decision of the Seventh Trial Court shows no objective analysis or evidence to prove that the defendant was a flight risk, other than being a writer and lawyer with work commitments abroad, or the necessity for that restrictive measure.167 179. Considering that the decision to restrict Mr. Álvarez right to leave the country lacked reasonable grounds to justify the necessity and proportionality of that measure, the Court concludes that Venezuela violated Article 22 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 8 thereof, to the detriment of Tulio Álvarez. In light of this conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to analyze the period during which said restrictive measure was in force, or the requests for permission to leave the country and their authorization by the Venezuelan courts. VIII-4 RIGHT TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION 168 A. Arguments of the parties and the Commission 180. The Commission recalled that the State clearly violated Mr. Tulio Álvarez’s right to effective judicial protection by rejecting the action of amparo he filed to be allowed to participate in the elections of the Professors’ Association of the Central University of Venezuela, despite the judgment granting him full freedom for compliance with his sentence, Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, para. 129; and Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia, para. 141. Cf. Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia, para. 147. 167 In the Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia (paragraph 115), the Court established some criteria based on comparative law to guide the judge’s decision in situations such as this case. “In relation to the foregoing, the Court finds that there are no precise criteria for setting the amount of the collateral bail bond or personal bail. However, comparative law offers guidance which, without completely eliminating the margin of discretion of the competent judicial authority, establishes certain parameters for the purposes of objectivity. These criteria include the following: a) the personal, professional, family and social circumstances of the defendant; b) the nature of the facts, and the quantum of the expected penalty (the greater it is, the higher the bail since the defendant would have a greater interest in evading Justice); c) the background of the defendant; d) whether the defendant has a known domicile or place of residence; e) whether the defendant has pending or parallel legal cases, and f) whether the defendant has been a fugitive or has a record of defaults, among other considerations.” 168 Article 25 of the Convention. 165 166 35