50 through the different phases of the proceedings, sought to assess the potential responsibility for supposed administrative wrongdoing, while respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence.256 158. In the present case, the Commission notes that in the proceedings conducted against judges Lone, Chévez and Barrios and Magistrate Flores, the Council served as a body for review of the SCJ’s decisions. However, as the Commission concluded earlier in this report, the Council: i) was not a competent body; ii) was not an impartial body; iii) did not protect the victims’ right of defense, and iv) is not hierarchically superior to the body whose decisions it reviewed. Given these circumstances, the Commission finds that the due guarantees that States must provide for a review under Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention were not observed. 159. The Commission also observes that although the Judicial Career Service Act provided that “[a] dismissal shall become final only when the appeals filed by the accused have been exhausted and decided”,257 the stage for review of the decision, conducted by Judicial Career Council, did not have the effect of suspending the Supreme Court’s decision ordering dismissal; in fact, the victims’ separation from their posts in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, took effect as soon as their replacements were named. 160. The Commission believes that enforcing a disciplinary sanction while the appeal of the decision of the court of first instance is still pending is incompatible with the principle of presumption of innocence and creates obstacles for reinstatement if the review body’s decision on the appeal is in the accused’ favor. 161. Thus, in the case of Judge Chévez de la Rocha, the Commission notes that while the Council’s view was that there no grounds for his dismissal, it also indicated that it was “impossible” and “inadvisable” to reinstate him because his replacement was already in the post and because he had said that he was “ashamed” of the Judiciary. Those impediments to the judge’s reinstatement were allowed under Article 68 of the Judicial Career Service Act, which mentions “possibility” or “advisability” as reasons that the Council can invoke for not reinstating a judge who was unjustifiably dismissed. 162. As the Court has written, if a review finds that a dismissal was arbitrary, then a judge so dismissed must be reinstated:258 This is so, because […] States could remove the judges and therefore intervene in the Judicial Power without greater costs or control. Additionally, this could generate a fear in the other judges, who observe that their colleagues are dismissed and then not reinstated even when the dismissal has been arbitrary. Said fear could also affect judicial 256 I/A Court H.R. Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2011, Series C No. 233, paragraph 131. 257 Regulations Governing the Judicial Career Service Act, published in the Official Record, La Gaceta, No. 25,657 of October 17, 1988. Article 188. 258 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 380, quoting I/A Court H.R., Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, paragraph 81.