70 235. In effect, as previously observed, while judges’ right to publicly express their views on matters of public interest is amply protected, they also have a special duty to exercise prudence and discretion with respect to the cases they are hearing and other matters, in order to safeguard the principles of independence and impartiality. The question that the Commission needs to answer, then, is whether the sanction imposed on the alleged victim was necessary, suitable and strictly proportional to ensure observance of the principles of independence and impartiality, which are essential to democratic ordre public. 236. In other cases, the organs of the inter-American system have held that when evaluating an alleged restriction or limitation to freedom of expression, the examination should not stop with the act in question; instead, the act must be examined in the context of the facts of the case as a whole, including the circumstances and context in which they occurred.307 The facts in this instance occurred in the context of the coup d’état that ousted President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras on June 28, 2009 and the emergence of a de facto government. In its report on Honduras: Human Rights and Coup d’État, the IACHR observed with concern that this serious institutional crisis also “took a heavy toll on the right to life, humane treatment, personal liberty, freedom of expression, sexual integrity, equality and nondiscrimination, the right to strike, the right to education, judicial guarantees, and others.”308 237. For the IACHR, the interruption of democratic and constitutional order in a country is a matter of nationwide public concern of the highest order. Social protest and social mobilization as expression and resistance to a coup d’état are fully and amply protected by the American Convention. In such extraordinary times for a country’s democratic way of life, the fact that a public official might face such a severe sanction as dismissal for having participated in a public demonstration on matters of fundamental importance to the preservation of democracy and the rule of law, must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny, where the State must credibly show that the dismissal was truly necessary and suitable in a democratic society. In other words, it must show that the restriction or limitation of rights is solely for the purpose claimed and that the same purpose could not have been reasonably served by a means less restrictive of human rights. 238. The evidence provided shows that on July 5, 2009, Judge López Lone participated in a massive public demonstration near Toncontín Airport, which was awaiting the arrival of President Zelaya. Tens of thousands of people were present at that demonstration. The SCJ’s decision to dismiss Judge López Lone considered that the fact that he had “actively participated in the political demonstration” was conduct “unbecoming the dignity of his office, incompatible with the principles of ethics and with the laws governing the conduct of judicial officials.” When deciding the appeal of Judge López Lone’s dismissal, the Judicial Career Council held that it was not just a question of a simple “political demonstration”, as described by the SCJ; it was also a “partisan” political demonstration, since there were “flags bearing the insignia of the different political organizations and ideologies represented there.” The Commission notes that the Judicial Career Council did not specify what the various ideologies were, nor did it say whether Judge López Lone had actively supported any of the parties present at the demonstration. Apparently it also did not examine whether the persons attending the demonstration came from various sectors of society, not just members of political parties or supporters 307 308 Cf. I/A Court H.R. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, paragraph 154. IACHR, Honduras: Human Rights and http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Honduras09eng/Toc.htm Coup d’état. December 30, 2009. Paragraph 163.