75 However, it observes that Article 53 of the Judicial Career Service Act is too vague with respect to the active subject and the prohibited conduct. This can lead to abuses in the disciplinary body’s application of this article, which can become a sweeping ban on any criticism by members of the Judiciary with respect to State institutions and officials. In effect, by applying this provision, the Judicial Career Council deemed that the remarks made by the alleged victim constituted defamation and slander, even though the Council never proved that the purpose of the remarks was not to participate in the public discourse on a matter of enormous national consequence, but instead to violate the autonomy of the judicial office or to harm the reputation of one or more of the judge’s colleagues. 256. Given the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that the removal of Judge Chévez de la Rocha constituted an illegal restriction of his right to freedom of expression, in violation of articles 9, 13(1) and 13(2) of the American Convention, in relation to articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. c. Tirza del Carmen Flores 257. The IACHR has established that Magistrate Flores Lanza filed a petition of amparo with the SCJ in which she alleged that “the residence of Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales had been entered illegally, whereupon he was apprehended and sent into forced exile in the city of San José, Costa Rica” on June 28. The petition identified the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces as the authority responsible for the alleged violations of Mr. Zelaya’s rights and sought, “as an urgent precautionary measure, the immediate repatriation of citizen President Manuel Zelaya Rosales.” That same day, Magistrate Tirza Flores and others also filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in which they accused four members of the Superior Council of the Honduran Armed Forces and several members of the National Congress of the crimes of abuse of authority, usurpation of functions, terrorism, rebellion, treason and crimes against the form of government and against high-ranking officials of the Honduran State.” 258. The SCJ labeled that conduct as a violation of Article 53 of the Judicial Career Service Act which, as previously explained, makes “slanderous or defamatory statements against the institutions or against any public servant or public official” an offense warranting a disciplinary sanction. Here, the Supreme Court wrote that the alleged victim was acting in a manner unbecoming her office by filing a complaint with the Attorney General’s Office accusing State officials of alleged crimes and by “making comments on the judicial activities of other jurisdictional bodies and of the SCJ itself.” 259. The IACHR notes that the Judicial Career Council subsequently confirmed the dismissal of magistrate Flores Lanza for noncompliance with the provisions of the law pertaining to the exercise of legal advocacy and representation and for her absence from her place of work [which is examined supra paragraph 184-189]. However it also found that the remarks classified as slanderous and defamatory were allegedly not sufficiently proved so that it reversed the SCJ’s decision regarding the alleged violation of Article 53 of the Judicial Career Service Act. 260. The foregoing notwithstanding, as previously observed, the IACHR is aware that in the instant case, the administrative disciplinary proceedings conducted against the alleged victims cannot be divorced from the backdrop against which they occurred, which amounted to a crisis of democracy. The petitioners maintain that the purpose of the proceedings instituted against the alleged victims, including the case brought against Magistrate Flores Lanza, was to “to prevent judges from continuing to raise questions about the regrettable role that the Honduran SCJ played [in the coup d’état] and to send an