5 for in Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights” (para. 18 of the Judgment rendered in the case of Kimel), that is, the failure to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with the duty to ensure rights as set forth in Article 1(1) of the Convention. In my concurring opinion to the Judgment rendered in the case of Herrera-Ulloa, I addressed this matter, arguing that before examining the appropriate formulation of criminal definitions to prevent excesses in the exercise of the right of journalists to inform and give their opinion, which was the object of the case of Herrera-Ulloa and, to some extent, has been the object in the case of Kimel, it is necessary to determine whether criminal proceedings are an appropriate, -on account of their uniqueness, necessity or, even, convenience- mechanism to tackle wrongful conducts. 19. I believe that criminal proceedings are not such appropriate and admissible mechanism. In stating this, I take into consideration that there are other control and response mechanisms which are less restrictive or injurious to the right infringed with which it is possible to achieve the same purpose, so that they come to be: a) consistent with the right of the individual offended by the insult, and b) sufficient to ensure social reprobation, which is a manner to redress the aggrieved party. If criminal proceedings are not such appropriate mechanism, their use will infringe the requirement of “necessity” set forth in Article 13(2), the requirement of “general interest” set forth in Article 30, and the reasons related to the “security of all and the just demands of the general welfare” as set forth in Article 32. Accordingly, these proceedings will not be in conformity with the American Convention and shall then be reconsidered. 20. In my vote in the case of Herrera-Ulloa, to which I now refer and whose considerations I reiterate, I pointed out that “before settling on how best to classify conducts as criminal offenses, one first has to decide whether the criminal law avenue is the one best suited to getting at the crux of the problem –in a manner consistent with the conflicting rights and interests and with the implications of the alternatives available to the lawmaker- or whether some other avenue, such as administrative or civil law, for example, might be a better juridical response. Indeed most infringements are not addressed as matters of criminal law or through criminal courts, but through measures of other kinds” (para. 14 of my opinion in the case of Herrera-Ulloa). 21. Such other “way of dealing with unlawful conduct” I then held and I reassert now “seems particularly appropriate in the case of (some or all) offenses against honor, good name and the reputation of individuals. Civil law courts can be used to achieve the same results that one might hope to get through criminal courts, without the risks and disadvantages that the latter pose. In fact, a conviction in civil court is in itself a statement that the conduct in question was unlawful, a statement no less emphatic and effective than a conviction in criminal court. Although the forum may be different in name, it can arrive at the same finding that a criminal law court would: i.e., that the respondent’s behavior constituted wrongful conduct detrimental to the plaintiff, who has the law and reason on his side. […] Thus, a civil judgment provides two types of reparation that are of greater interest to an aggrieved party and social satisfaction in the form of the court’s censure of the unlawful conduct” (para. 18 of my opinion in the case of Herrera-Ulloa). 22. In the case of Kimel, the plaintiff in the criminal proceedings started against the author of the book questioned was a judicial officer. Naturally, public officials must be afforded the legal protection that the State has the duty to provide with