women who decide not to be mothers have less worth than the others, or are undesirable persons. In addition, this imposes on women the responsibility of prioritizing the well-being of their children, even over their own well-being, regardless of the circumstances. 145. In this regard, the Court stresses that such gender stereotyping is incompatible with international human rights law.253 The Court also reiterates that the use of stereotyping by state authorities is particularly worrying254 and, therefore, measures to eliminate it should be taken immediately. 146. Based on the above, the Court considers that Manuela’s guilt was presumed from the very start of the investigation. Moreover, little effort was made to determine the truth of what happened and to take into account the probative elements that could have disproved the thesis of the presumed victim’s guilt. This attitude was also encouraged by the investigators’ prejudices against women who do not comply with the role of self-sacrificing mothers who must always seek to protect their children. The prejudices and negative gender stereotyping affected the objectivity of the agents in charge of the investigations, closing possible lines of investigation into the actual circumstances.255 The Court also notes that, in this case, the failings in the investigation correspond to the context previously determined by the Court (supra para. 44), in which, frequently, no investigation is conducted into the possibility that the mother is not responsible for causing the death of which she is accused. B.2.b The reasoning behind the guilty verdict 147. In this regard, it should be recalled that this Court does not constitute a fourth instance that can assess the evidence concerning the possible guilt or innocence of the presumed victim in this case.256 Its purpose is not to determine Manuela’s innocence or guilt, but rather to decide whether the judicial authorities violated obligations established in the Convention; particularly, the obligation to provide the reasons for a decision, the principle of presumption of innocence, and the right to be tried by an impartial court. 148. The duty to state the reasons for a decision is one of the “due guarantees” included in Article 8(1) to safeguard the right to due process.257 The Court has established that the statement of reasons is the externalization of the reasoned justification that allows a conclusion to be reached258 and entails a rational presentation of the reasons that led the judge to take a decision. The relevance of this guarantee relates to the correct administration of justice and the avoidance of arbitrary decisions. Furthermore, the statement of reasons Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 302, and Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2015. Series C No. 307, para. 148. 253 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, para. 401, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 235. 254 Cf. Case of Gutiérrez Hernández et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 24, 2017. Series C No. 339, para. 184. 255 Mutatis mutandis, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 222, and Case of Moya Solís v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 3, 2021. Series C No. 425, para. 28. 256 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra para. 78, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of October 6, 2020. Series C No. 412, para. 106. 257 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 107, and Case of Moya Solís v. Peru, supra, para. 83. 258 44