those events were not known when the Court ordered the lifting of the provisional measures on November 26, 2010, but were provided as supervening evidence and would clearly have had an impact on the assessment made by the Court. In this regard, “the fact that the Court and the Commission were unaware of these events is precisely because the State was not exercising the necessary supervision or implementing the measures to protect the beneficiaries of the provisional measures in force at the time. Consequently, the Commission considered that it was unnecessary to make a new, separate analysis of the matter, as the State claimed, because the events occurred while the provisional measures were in force, without the State providing the appropriate protection.” Lastly, the Commission stated that, irrespective of how the name given to the concept of “re-opening,” the situation that occurred reveals the concurrence of the elements of extreme gravity and urgency, and the need to avoid irreparable harm to persons. 28. With regard to the State’s observations concerning whether the Commission should have issued precautionary measures before submitting the request that is being decided, this Court recognizes that, in several matters, when ordering provisional measures, the Court has found it relevant that, previously, the Commission had ordered the State to adopt precautionary measures and that these had not produced the required protection or the State had not adopted them.7 Moreover, the Court has recognized the importance of the precautionary measures ordered by the Commission as an instrument of prevention and protection and, in numerous cases, the Commission’s practice has been to order them before submitting a request for provisional measures to the Court. Despite this, Article 63(2) of the Convention does not require as a prerequisite for the Court to order provisional measures that the Commission should have previously ordered precautionary measures or any other requisites that could delay or prevent their issue, thus increasing the risk to the human rights that should be protected. Consequently, the observations of the State in this regard are without merit. 29. The Court also observes that, as the State has noted, the concept of “reopening” provisional measures is not established in the Court’s Rules of Procedure. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the Court from examining the Commission’s arguments in view of the alleged needs for protection of persons by provisional measures, in the terms of Article 63(2) of the Convention. Regardless of the name used by the Commission to submit its request, the request is founded on the alleged existence of acts that took place while the provisional measures recently lifted in the matter of the Mendoza Prisons were in force, and the beneficiaries of those measures were the same individuals whose protection is now requested. Therefore, the Court can consider the Commission’s request as a simple request for provisional measures, just as it has in previous matters where the Court has ordered such measures even when they had already been lifted.8 In this situation, even if the Commission did not hear the State 7 Cf., inter alia, Matter of Case of Vogt. Provisional measures with regard to Guatemala, Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of April 12, 1996, fifth considering paragraph; Matter of María Lourdes Afiuni. Provisional measures with regard to Venezuela, Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of December 10, 2010, ninth considering paragraph; Matter of Gladys Lanza Ochoa. Provisional measures with regard to Honduras, Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 2, 2010, tenth considering paragraph. 8 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo, Provisional measures with regard to Peru. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of December 13, 2000, the measures were lifted by the Order of the Inter-American 13