17 77. The Court has also written that: a State cannot be responsible for all the human rights violations committed between individuals within its jurisdiction. Indeed, the nature erga omnes of the treaty-based guarantee obligations of the States does not imply their unlimited responsibility for all acts or deeds of individuals, because its obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by the awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and to the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. In other words, even though an act, omission or deed of an individual has the legal consequence of violating the specific human rights of another individual, this is not automatically attributable to the State, because the specific circumstances of the case and the 79 execution of these guarantee obligations must be considered. 78. In order to determine whether the acts of third parties can be deemed violations for which the State bears international responsibility, the Court has cited the jurisprudence of the European Court, which suggests that a state can be held internationally responsible for violations committed by third parties when it is shown that the State knew of a real and immediate risk and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent it. The Inter-American Court cited the jurisprudence of the European Court, which is that: Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see 80 the Osman judgment […], pp. 3159-60, § 116). 79. In the case of María Da Penha v. Brazil, the IACHR found that the State violated its obligation to act with due diligence to prevent, punish and eradicate the violence perpetrated against the victim, by not prosecuting, convicting and punishing the perpetrator for five years, despite the complaints lodged. The IACHR concluded that the violation was part of a “a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the State” and hence constituted not only a failure to fulfill the obligation with respect 81 to prosecution and conviction, but also the obligation to prevent these degrading practices. 80. The Inter-American Court has written that in cases of violence against women, an obligation of strict due diligence arises with regard to reports of missing women, with respect to search 82 operations during the first hours and days. This obligation of means is a more rigorous one and thus demands an immediate and effective response on the part of authorities when complaints of 83 disappearances are filed, to adequately prevent the violence against women. This includes an exhaustive search. It also requires that the officials in charge of receiving the missing persons reports have the capacity and the sensitivity to understand the seriousness of the phenomenon of violence 79 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, paragraph 123. 80 European Court of Human Rights, Kiliç v. Turkey, Judgment of March 28, 2000, Application No. 22492/93, paragraphs 62 - 63; Osman v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of October 28, 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, paragraphs 115 - 116; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, paragraph 124. 81 IACHR, Merits Report No. 54/01, Maria Da Penha Fernandes (Brazil), April 16, 2001. 82 I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, paragraph 283. 83 I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, paragraph 285.