90. Thus, since the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, the Court has affirmed that the obligation to ensure rights pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Convention entails the State duty to organize the whole governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public powers are exercised, so that they are capable of ensuring, legally, the free and full exercise of human rights.89 In the context of this obligation to ensure rights, judicial independence stands out as an essential element of the organization of the governmental apparatus without which the State is unable to ensure the free and full exercise of rights. 90 Consequently, judicial independence is essential for the protection and effective guarantee of human rights.91 91. Ultimately, without judicial independence the rule of law does not exist and democracy is not possible (Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter92) because judges must have adequate and sufficient guarantees to exercise their function to decide the disputes that occur in society in accordance with the law. The lack of independence and respect for their authority is synonymous with arbitrariness. 92. In this regard, in addition to being widely guaranteed at the international 93 and regional level,94 judicial independence has been proclaimed in the Constitutions of the States that have Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 166. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers at the time indicated that “[t]he enforcement of human rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice, an independent, competent and impartial justice system is paramount if it is to uphold the rule of law”. Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/32, April 28, 2014, para. 3. See also, Human Right Commission, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy, Doc. E/CN.4/1995/39, February 6, 1995, para. 100, and General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, UN Doc. A/69/2/94, August 11, 2014, para. 28. In addition, the Consultative Council of European Judges has considered that “Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial,” because “Judges are ‘charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens.’” Cf. Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 1 (2001) for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges (Recommendation No. R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges and the relevance of its standards and other international standards to current problems in these fields), para. 10. 91 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27.2, 25(1) and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30; Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra, para. 68, and Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 75. 92 Cf. OAS General Assembly, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXVIII-E/01) of September 11, 2001. 93 Cf. United Nations, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985, and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985, Principles 1, 2, 12 and 18, and the Bangalore Principles on Judicial Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices, under the auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and in the context of the Global Programme against Corruption, annexed to resolution 2006/23 of July 27, 2006, of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, principle 1 and application 1(1). For its part, the Human Rights Committee has indicated that “States should take specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-making.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14. Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, August 23, 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 19. 94 Cf. Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Members States on the independence, efficiency and role of judges, adopted on October 13, 1994, Principles I.1., I.2.b. and d., and I.3, and European Charter on the Statute of Judges, 1998, (DAJ/DOC (98) 23), para. 1(1). See, Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 1 (2001) for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges (Recommendation No. R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges and the relevance of its standards and other international standards to current problems in these fields), para. 60; Opinion No. 3 (2002) for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on “Ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality,” para. 16, and the Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) adopted at the 11th plenary meeting, Strasbourg, November 17, 2010, Principle 10. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa establish that “[t]he independence of judicial bodies and judicial officers shall be […] respected by the government, its agencies and 89 90 24