29 defence, not only individual but [also] of the whole society”. As such, the State invoked the Criminal Code of the National Police in force at that time, which establishes in its Article 21 the circumstances in which police or the Public Forces members would be exempted of responsibility. Furthermore, the State alleged that the Commission “refers to the [United Nations] Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials [sic] […] and to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials [sic] [… and that] both foresee the exception of selfdefence”; and that Article 51 of “the Charter of the United Nations recognizes and reaffirms the right to use military force in self-defence”. Similarly, the State invoked Articles 22 and 29 of the Charter of the OAS. 100. However, in its final oral arguments the State declared that “the said self-defence could be assumed on the grounds of the autopsies” of the three alleged victims and the alleged gunshot received by a state agent, since there is no judicial decision which specifies the circumstances of the death of the three alleged victims. Then, in its final written arguments, the State asserted that “two clear possibilities [were to be considered]: the configuration of either an extrajudicial execution or acts of self-defense”. Moreover, the State alleged that in order to be qualified as an extrajudicial execution, the death of an individual must be deliberate and unjustified, which has not been proven by the representatives or by the Commission, and therefore a reasonable doubt over what happened remains. 101. As mentioned, in this case Mr. Zambrano Vélez, Mr. Caicedo Cobeña and Mr. Caicedo Cobeña were deprived of their lives by state agents that made use of lethal force, in the framework of a security operation and in the exercise of their functions. Effectively, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials both prohibit the use of firearms, “except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender” and “except in self-defence or defence of others [… or] to arrest a person presenting [imminent threat of death or serious injury] and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.”85 In the instant case, it has not been demonstrated that those persons were deprived of their life in any of those exceptional situations. 102. Moreover, regarding the State’s plea concerning Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and Articles 22 and 29 of the Charter of the OAS (supra para. 99), it is important to clarify that this concept of “self-defence” found within these instruments refers to a State’s power which is limited in scope and which is recognized by International Law as an exception to the general prohibition of war and the use of force, in order to maintain international peace and security. This understanding of “self-defence” would not apply, in any way, to the determination by this Court of the international responsibility of the State under the American Convention for acts or omissions by state agents in a security operation. 103. Furthermore, this Court has held that Article 1(1) is fundamental for deciding whether a violation of the human rights recognized in the Convention may be attributed to the State Party to its full extent. Thus, any violation of human rights enshrined in the Convention that can be attributed to acts or omissions by any public authority, according to the rules of International Law, constitutes a fact attributable to the State which compromises its international responsibility in the terms set forth in the said Convention and according to general International Law. It is a principle 85 Cf. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 34/169 of December 17, 1979, Article 3; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eight Congress of the Unites Nations for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Criminals, Havana, Cuba, August 27 - September 7 1990, Principle 9.