(complementarily), so that both the domestic and the international decision criteria and the protection and reparation mechanisms can be established and harmonized. 111 As a result, in application of the principle of complementarity (or subsidiarity), the Court has held that, under the Convention, state responsibility can only be required at the international level after the State has had the opportunity to recognize, as appropriate, a violation of a right and to redress the harm caused by its own means. 112 Thus, when the State ceases to violate human rights and makes reparation to the victims for the violations, it does not behoove the Court to declare international responsibility for the violations in question. 83. In relation to the above, the Court notes that, on June 1, 2020, the National Population and Immigration Department “in view of the conclusions presented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” deemed it appropriate to revoke Resolution 1088 of May 11, 1992. The Court holds that this decision effectively ended the State’s non-compliance with the obligations contained in Articles 22(5), 22(6), 7, 8(1), 8(2)(b), (c), (d) and (h), and 19 of the American Convention. Likewise, the Court recalls that, as previously indicated (supra, para. 81), although the content of Resolution 1088 ran contrary to the Convention, it never materially affected the rights of the alleged victims. Therefore, given the lack of evidence of specific violations of the rights of the alleged victims, the Court holds that the revocation of Resolution 1088 constituted an adequate reparation in relation to the violations of the American Convention that occurred when it was issued. 84. Consequently, this Court concludes, as it has done in other cases, 113 and considering the circumstances of this case, that since the violations ceased, and reparation was made, in application of the principle of complementarity, the State is not internationally responsible for violating the rights contained in Articles 22(5), 7, 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(b), (c), (d) and (h), and 9 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Ms. Habbal, nor for violating the rights contained in Articles 22(6), 7, 8(1), 8(2)(b), (c), (d) and (h), and 19 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Monnawar Al Kassar, Hifaa Al Kassar and Natasha Al Kassar, nor for violating Articles 19 and 8(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mohamed Al Kassar. 85. With respect to the representatives’ argument regarding the alleged violation of the right to equality before the law contained in Article 24 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, the Court notes that the legal consequences of the immigration authorities’ failure to consider the special situation of vulnerability in which the alleged victims found themselves in the immigration proceedings have already been addressed in the analysis in relation to Articles 22, 19, 8, and 7 of the Convention. Therefore, it does not deem it necessary to carry out a specific analysis in the light of Article 24 of the Convention. 111 Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 143, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of October 6, 2020. Series C No. 412, para. 167. Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 143, and Case of Urrutia Laubreaux v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 2020. Series C No. 409, para. 90. 112 Cf. Case of Tarazona Arrieta et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 15, 2014. Series C No. 286, para. 140, and Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of December 1, 2016. Series C No. 330, para. 102. 113 28