It therefore argued that the Court should refrain from ruling on any of the alleged violations of the alleged victims’ rights. It added that as there was no information about Ms. Habbal’s son and daughters, they should not be regarded as alleged victims in the case. It also pointed out that since Ms. Habbal’s son and daughters were not named in the power of attorney granted to her representatives 26 years ago, the fact that the representatives claimed to be acting on their behalf was insufficient to prove that they had powers of representation. The State also affirmed that there was no information to suggest that Ms. Habbal had taken part in the proceedings, nor that she genuinely wished that the international application to be made. 16. The Commission contended that the State’s arguments were limited to a discussion of the representation of the alleged victims, which is a requirement for a case to be brought before the Court, but not an issue that affects its jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not a preliminary objection. Furthermore, with regard to representation and the alleged victims’ wish that the case continue, the Commission noted that the Court itself had established that the fact that an alleged victim had legal representation, but had not been found, might affect the determination of reparations, but not the processing or hearing of the case. The Commission argued that in the case in question the alleged victims had a representative, as demonstrated by the powers of attorney to be found in the file, which showed that they wished to be represented. It also argued that accepting the State’s reasoning would mean that powers that were still valid would need to be ratified, which could disproportionately affect some of the victims before the Inter-American System, or those who had faced serious violations such as forced disappearance or extrajudicial executions. Therefore, the Commission asked the Court to reject the State’s preliminary objection. 17. The representatives maintained that their representation was covered by the special power of attorney granted by Ms. Habbal at the time, which had been submitted to the Court. They also argued that Mr. Varela had acted before the Commission throughout the proceedings on the basis of the power of attorney, which was still in effect. Therefore, they held that the proceedings should continue, even in the alleged victims’ absence, since proceedings in absentia were prohibited only with respect to the accused, not the victim. They argued that in a number of judgments the Court had found in favor of absentees in order to safeguard the alleged victims’ right to the truth and to obtain reparation. The representatives also contended that, although there was no documentation showing they had been granted powers to represent Ms. Habbal’s son and daughters, they should be heard in order to protect the right to effective judicial protection, as a position that is more in keeping with access to justice and the pro-homine principle. Furthermore, the representatives suggested that, in accordance with the principle of estoppel, the State’s position should be rejected because it was not presented at the correct point in the proceedings. A.2. Abstract, hypothetical-conjectural and/or groundless nature of the alleged rights violations 18. The State argued that the actions of the immigration authorities did not have, nor were they having, any effect on the freedom of movement and residence and other rights of Ms. Habbal and her son and daughters, so there was no case or dispute that warranted the Court’s intervention. That was the case, the State maintained, because neither the Merits Report nor the ESAP had identified, much less demonstrated, specific harm had been done due to the acts, facts or rules challenged, making the present matter conjectural. Therefore, it argued, there was no injury, damage or interest for which a ruling of the Court could order redress or compensation. Furthermore, the State argued that the recommendations of the 6