6 to satisfy the claims of the alleged victim with regard to control of the legality of the administrative act of dismissal, such as the claim regarding whether the effective date of the dismissal was prior or subsequent to the decision ordering her transfer. Based on the foregoing, the IACHR finds that the petitioner did not exhaust the remedy available in the State with regard to this point of her complaint. 33. Additionally, the Commission notes that one of the petitioner’s claims before the InterAmerican system is that she had been dismissed in retaliation for her decisions and had not been afforded due process. The petitioner further contended that while serving in a career post on a temporary basis, she was dismissed by a decision devoid of any legal reasoning and without taking into account her special circumstances. 34. As to whether the administrative procedure is suitable to offer an adequate remedy for the claim relating to the lack of due process and legal reasoning, the Commission notes that, as of 2003, the Council of State, the highest adjudicatory body for disputes arising from “actions to vacate an administrative act and restore a right”, reaffirmed its legal precedent wherein it established that “employees appointed on a temporary basis are not protected by any privilege of stability, and consequently, they may be removed, without any legal reasoning." 5 35. Consequently, the Commission notes, for purposes of this admissibility, that even though the “action to vacate an administrative act and restore the right” constitutes a remedy to exercise control over the legality of the dismissal, based on the doctrine of the Council of State, this action does not constitute a suitable remedy to obtain the legal reasoning for the dismissal. As to the suitability of the administrative procedure to obtain said reasoning, the Constitutional Court of Colombia has found that: “there is no alternative mechanism of judicial defense aimed at getting the Administration to produce the legal reasoning which, as precedent says, is indispensable to establish whether there has been harm to fundamental rights. Therefore, tutela in this case is the final mechanism […] 6. 36. Taking into consideration that the doctrine of the Council of State has consistently held that it is not necessary to provide legal reasoning for a decision on a dismissal, and that the Constitutional Court has upheld that the procedure to obtain the reasoning for the act of dismissal is not through the administrative procedure, 7 the Commission considers that the State has not provided sufficient information to prove that the remedy of the “action to vacate an administrative act and restore the right” offers any reasonable prospects of success for the claims of the petitioner relating to the lack of reasoning of the act of dismissal. 8 37. As for the constitutional procedure, the Commission notes that the Constitutional Court of Colombia has found that legal reasoning for removal from office of temporary career officials “responds to the guarantee of the principles of legality and public disclosure and respect for due process, inasmuch as 5 Council of State, Second Section, case file 76001-23-31-000-1998-1834-01(4972-01), Judgment of March 13, 2003. As determined by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, based on said decision, “this has been the position of the Council of State and based on it, it has refrained from vacating administrative acts of this type when actions to vacate and restore a right have been used.” See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment SU-917 of 2010. 6 Judgment T-1240 of 2004. Also see Judgment SU-917 of 2010. 7 In Judgment SU-917 of 2010, the Constitutional Court of Colombia entertained a total of 20 appellants, who had filed an action to vacate and restore the right through an administrative procedure and whose claims were denied by the Council of State, under the argument that acts of dismissal from temporary career positions do not require any grounds at all. 8 In its jurisprudence, the Commission has shared the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights that the petitioner can be exempted from exhausting domestic remedies with respect to a petition when it is clear in the case proceedings that no action would have reasonable prospects of success in light of the jurisprudence of the highest judicial body of the State. See, for example, IACHR, 1271-04, Report 42/08, Karen Atala and daughters v. Chile (Admissibility), para. 52; IACHR, Petition 1490-05, Report 52/07, Jessica González v. United States (Admissibility), Annual Report of the IACHR 2008, para. 50; IACHR, Case 11.193, Report 51/00, Gary Graham v. United States (Admissibility), Annual Report of the IACHR 2000, para. 60, wherein it cites inter alia the European Court of Human Rights, Case of De Wilde, Oomas and Versyp. June 10, 1971, Publ. E.C.H.R. Ser. A Vol. 12, p. 34, paras. 37 and 62.