considers that the ruling issued on February 22, 1995 by the First Chamber of the National Chamber of Appeals is the judicial decision that established the defendant’s criminal responsibility, and not the aforementioned ruling on the inadmissibility of the special appeal. Likewise, the Court does not consider that the State is correct in arguing that on that occasion the Chamber did not exceed its authority when expressing its opinion on what it characterized as a “material error.” This did not constitute a correction of a material error, since that court carried out a legal assessment on the merits of the complaint regarding the retroactive application of Decree No. 692 of 1992. 135. The Court stresses that, by filing the special federal appeal and the motion for review, Mr. Mohamed’s defense lawyer emphasized that one of the aspects of the conviction that needed to be revised was its legal basis and, in this regard, he stated that “the essential point of the grievance” was that the Appeals Chamber had “sought to base the [offense] on regulations that were not applicable to the case” since the decree mentioned in the judgment was not in force at the time of the traffic accident (supra paras. 52 and 57). He added that in the motion for review of appeal there had been a violation of Article 9 of the American Convention (supra para. 57). 136. In this case, Mr. Mohamed was convicted for the crime of manslaughter defined in Article 84 of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the facts (traffic accident). However, the Commission and the representatives argue that what constituted a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity (freedom from ex post facto laws) was that the court integrated the criminal offense with the rules of Decree No. 692/92, which regulates motor vehicle traffic and which came into force after the facts of the case. It is not disputed that the aforementioned traffic regulation109 was not in effect at the time of the incident that led to the criminal proceedings against Mr. Mohamed. 137. The Court advises that, being an offense of negligence, whose criminal definition is open and must be completed by the judge upon analyzing the legal definition of the crime, what is important is that the judgment identify the corresponding duty of care infringed by the defendant’s active behavior (imprudence) or omission (negligence), as a determining factor in bringing about the harmful result of the juridical right protected. In addition to referring to recklessness and negligence, Article 84 of the Argentine Criminal Code states that said behavior could imply incompetence or failure to observe regulations or duties, behaviors that this Court understands are also included in the general concepts of recklessness and negligence. The Court considers that, contrary to the arguments of the representatives (supra para. 128), in determining which objective duty of care was violated in each case, given that this matter involved a traffic accident, the judge is not limited to applying a formal rule such as traffic regulations. It is important to point out that the expert Julio B. J. Maier stated at the public hearing that, even when dealing with regulated activities, it is possible to define recklessness or negligence using sources other than the regulations, but the judgment must clearly state the grounds for the recklessness and the facts that resulted in said recklessness or negligence. 138. Among the grounds for the conviction, the Chamber indicated that it had not limited itself to analyzing whether the traffic light gave the defendant the right of way, but instead it had to consider whether he had engaged in “any reckless action” or behavior contrary to “the objective duty of care.” (supra para. 49). In this regard, the Chamber held that Mr. Mohamed “failed to comply with the regulation that prohibits a vehicle from overtaking another at an intersection, precisely to ensure that drivers have the necessary visibility at all times and are therefore in control of their action.” Likewise, the Chamber referred to “[t]he rules of care” and, upon citing the aforementioned traffic regulations, did so in the following terms: 109 Supra note 54. 38