were, it should declare so in the judgment”, leaving it up to the “domestic courts” to determine “the reparations that should be granted […] Mr. Mohamed”. Argentina held that the pecuniary measures of reparation requested by the representatives “should be rejected” and objected to Mr. Mohamed being granted compensation for lost earnings and for direct expenses incurred, such as the loans requested and assistance from neighbors and the fact that Mr. Mohamed’s mother was forced to take financial responsibility for the Mohamed Potenza family. The State considered that the amount of compensation requested for lost earnings was “exorbitant” and that the amount requested for direct expenses “lack[ed] any justification.” Likewise, the State argued that the “non-pecuniary [measures of reparation] requested by the representatives should be rejected” 132, and denied that Mr. Mohamed’s life project had been altered.133 The State affirmed that the “exorbitant” amount requested by the representatives as compensation for these damages lacks evidentiary basis. Likewise, it rejected the notion that “non-pecuniary damages can be calculated on the basis of a percentage of the pecuniary damages, and that it could be of the order of 20% of the latter.” Considerations of the Court 167. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damages and defined the circumstances in which compensation must be paid. This Court has established that pecuniary damage contemplates “the loss or detriment to the income of the victims, the expenses incurred as a result of the facts, and the monetary consequences that have a causal nexus with the facts of the case.”134 168. The Court has also explained, in its case law, the concept of non-pecuniary damage and has established that it “may include both the suffering and difficulties caused to the direct victim and his next of kin, the harm to values that are of great significance to the individual, and also the changes, of a non-pecuniary nature, in the living conditions of the victim or his family.”135 169. The Court has determined in this Judgment that Mr. Mohamed’s right to appeal his conviction was violated (supra para. 117). This meant that a penalty of disqualification from driving for eight years was imposed on him, in a judgment that could not be appealed. 170. In his statement rendered before a notary public, Mr. Mohamed said that the conviction made him feel “worthless, that he was no good at [his] job.” Regarding the special appeal, Mr. Mohamed said that “the ordeal with the courts continued” because 132 The Court notes that the State presented these arguments and those included in the following footnote in an attachment to its answer brief. The Court admits these because they were submitted together with that brief within the appropriate period. The State rejected: i) Mr. Mohamed’s alleged inability to find work as a driver after “his professional license” was withdrawn and that as a result, he had not been able to carry out his professional work; ii) that [Mr. Mohamed’s] “opportunities for growth and social and cultural development were affected”; iii) “that the Mohamed Potenza family had been placed in a vulnerable situation”; iv) that the Mohamed Potenza family “had were now on the fringes of poverty” as a consequence “of the State’s actions”; v) “[t]hat they had not had effective judicial protection, or adequate “protection of health and social security”; vi) “[t]hat the personal integrity of Mr. Mohamed and his family was violated” ”, and vii) “[t]hat the alleged hardships suffered by Mr. Mohamed due to the loss of his job should be assessed”. 133 As to the possible effects on Mr. Mohamed’s life project the State rejected: i) “[t]hat the life expectations of Mohamed and his family had been changed” and therefore “[t]hat [Mr.] Mohamed had been left without any possibility of working, even in another activity”, and ii) that as a result, “his living conditions changed in such a way as to frustrate the life project of Mohamed’s family”. 134 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 43, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs, para. 281. 135 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs, para. 284. 46