b) Negligence; c) Incompetence in one’s art or profession; d) Failure to observe the regulations or duties under one’s responsibility. The judgment in this case analyzed the facts that occurred, both according to the testimony of a witness and, in particular, according to Mr. Mohamed’s own statements, and reached the conclusion that “this account suffices to demonstrate the defendant’s recklessness in driving the vehicle for which he was responsible.” More specifically, it states that “Mohamed, failing to exercise reasonable care to guarantee the assets of others, started up his bus in order to pass to the left of another bus, so that when he was behind he voluntarily deprived himself of any possibility of preventing a collision with the pedestrian who was still crossing on the crosswalk, unlike the bus of line 103, which, by maintaining the necessary field of view from his position, avoided a collision” (bold and cursive added). To those facts, a law was applied that was already in effect, so that there could not be any violation of Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (“the American Convention”). 5. Duty of care and regulatory provisions. Criminal doctrine generally includes the grounds mentioned in Article 84 of the Criminal Code within the overall concept of failure to observe the duty of care. Likewise, the interpretation of said article leads to the conclusion that – as already noted– it is sufficient that a single one of the grounds mentioned is present in order to configure a crime of negligence. This point requires clarification in relation to the failure to observe rules or duties under a person’s responsibility. On the one hand, such non-observance in itself is not sufficient to constitute a crime, since the action must have had an impact on causing the outcome (death)4. On the other, observance of the rules or duties under a person’s responsibility does not exclude the configuration of a crime for any other of the grounds mentioned in Article 84, in other words, imprudence or negligence or incompetence in his art or profession. This last point was made perfectly clear at the hearing by expert witness Julio Maier5, when, in response to a question, he said that even in regulated activities it is possible to define recklessness or negligence using sources other than the regulations, but the judgment must clearly state the grounds for the recklessness and the facts that resulted in said recklessness or negligence.6 That is precisely what has happened in this case. As is perfectly clear from the transcript of the relevant parts of the Chamber’s ruling (supra, para. 3) those requirements were fully met– although obviously it will be up to the Argentine courts, in the proceeding to guarantee Mr. Oscar Alberto Mohamed the right to appeal the conviction (Operative Paragraph 2 of the Judgment of this Court), to decide whether the assessment of the evidence, the determination of the proven facts and their legal definition were correct. 6. Scope of the citation of the National Traffic and Transport Regulations. The alleged violation of Article 9 of the Convention, then, can only be based on the mention of the National Traffic and Transportation Regulations (Decree N° 692 of 1992), which entered into force some weeks after the action attributed to Mr. Mohamed. According to the Commission, the ruling of the Chamber “integrated the crime of manslaughter established in Article 84 of the [Argentine] Criminal Code, with the provisions of Decree No. 692/92” (cited in para. 127 of the judgment of this Court). According to the representatives, “the conviction was based on a regulation that was not in effect, given that, at the time of the events, Decree No. 12.689, issued in 1945, was in force” (idem, para. 128). In my view, those arguments are baseless. The terms of the Chamber’s ruling show that the grounds for his conviction are related to principles and norms recognized in international practice and to an interpretation of the concepts of 4  For example, the failure to observe a regulatory requirement to carry beacons or other safety equipment in the vehicle in the event of  parking on a road has no impact on causing the outcome if the vehicle ran over a pedestrian and caused his or her death.  5  The expert witness proposed by the representatives to provide an opinion, in the first place, “on the principle criminal legality” (Order of  the President of the Court of 4‐VI‐2012, operative paragraph 8, A‐2).  6  Judgment, para. 136 in fine.  3