elements of the definition are present. 227 The European Court of Human Rights, 228 the Human Rights Committee, 229 the Committee against Torture, 230 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 231 and the United Nations Rapporteur against Torture 232 have all indicated likewise. Because Article 5(2) of the American Convention does not specify what should be understood as “torture,” the Court has resorted to both Article 2 of the ICPPT 233 and other definitions contained in the international instruments prohibiting torture 234 to arrive at the elements constitutive of torture. 235 Based on these instruments, it has determined that torture is present when the ill-treatment: (i) is intentional; (ii) causes severe physical or mental suffering, and (iii) is committed with any objective or purpose. 236 102. Regarding analysis of this case, based on the evidence, the Court finds that the seriousness and intensity of the severe physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse suffered by Ms. Bedoya, perpetrated without interruption over the course of approximately 10 hours while she was in a state of total defenselessness, tied up and under the control of her attackers, is proven. 237 It likewise has been established that she was subjected to rape by multiple perpetrators, an exceedingly traumatic experience that has severe consequences and causes great psychological and physical damage that leaves the victim "physically and emotionally humiliated.” 238 Along these lines, the Court has 227 Cf. Case of Penal Miguel Castro Castro v. Peru, supra, para. 312; and Case of Azul Rojas Marín et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 160. Cf. ECHR, Aydin v. Turkey [GS], No. 23178/94. Judgment of September 25, 1997, para. 86. Likewise, the European Court has ruled on the positive obligations derived from article 3 of the European Convention (Prohibition of torture) in cases of rape and sexual abuse. Cf., among others, ECHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98. Judgment of December 4, 2003, para. 153, and ECHR, I.C. v. Romania, No. 36934/08. Judgment of May 24, 2016, para. 52. 228 229 Cf. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28, The equality of rights between men and women, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 2000, paras. 11 and 20. Cf. Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of article 2 by States parties, CAT/C/GC/2, January 24, 2008, para. 18. 230 231 Cf. UN, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 35 on genderbased violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/GC/35, July 26, 2017, para. 16. “Genderbased violence against women may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in certain circumstances, including in cases of rape, domestic violence or harmful practices.” 232 Cf. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, A/HRC/7/3, January 15, 2008, paras. 28 to 31, and Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez, A/HRC/31/57, January 5, 2016, para. 51. 233 Article 2 of the ICPPT establishes, in its pertinent part, that: “For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose [...].” 234 Especially Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment, which establishes the following: 1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application. Cf. Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 164, paras. 78 and 79, and Case of Lopez Soto et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 189. 235 236 Cf. Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina, supra, para. 79, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 186. 237 Cf. Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 187. 238 Cf, Case of Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, supra, para. 311, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela, supra, 40