PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MANUEL E. VENTURA ROBLES My partial dissent with regard to the fifteenth operative paragraph of this judgment in Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, “in relation to the determination of compensation for loss of potential earnings,” refers specifically to the criterion adopted by the majority of the judges of the Court when determining the amount for loss of earnings, which assessed positively the relevant measures taken by the domestic courts in the case sub judice and considered the amount calculated by these courts to be reasonable in terms of the Court’s case law. Textually, paragraph 246 of the judgment reads: 246. The Court considers that, when national mechanisms exist to determine forms of reparations, these procedures and results can be assessed (supra para. 139). If these mechanisms do not satisfy criteria of objectivity, reasonableness and effectiveness to make adequate reparation for the violations of rights recognized in the Convention that have been declared by this Court, it is for the Court, in exercise of its subsidiary and complementary competence, to order the pertinent reparations. In this regard, it has been determined that the next of kin of Senator Cepeda Vargas had access to the administrative courts, which established compensation for loss of potential earnings based on objective and reasonable criteria. Consequently, the Court assesses positively the measures taken by the domestic courts in this case, 1 and finds that the amount established by these courts is reasonable in terms of its case law. This text, approved by the majority of the judges of the Court, adopted a criterion that I do not share with regard to the subsidiary nature of the international protection of human rights under the inter-American system, and to the nature of the compulsory competence or jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The principle of the complementary and subsidiary nature of the inter-American system of human rights is established in the second paragraph of the Preamble of the American Convention on Human Rights, which stipulates: Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States; And Article 46(1)(a) of the said Convention which establishes that: 1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: (a) That the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. The Convention is frugal as regards the nature and functions of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, but it is sufficiently clear in specifying the essential aspects. Thus, Article 62(1) of the Convention establishes that: A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention. 1 Cf. La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163, para. 245.