70. The State indicated that the consideration made by the Disciplinary Court regarding Mr. Mina Cuero's recidivism "did not constitute [...] stigmatization or a violation of the presumption of innocence principle, but rather an application of the nature of disciplinary law that aims to correct, supervise, [and] evaluate the conduct" of the accused official. A.3. The principle of legality and the right to have sufficient reasoning. 71. The Commission pointed out that the Disciplinary Court ordered "the dismissal" of Mr. Mina Cuero based on the grounds provided in clauses 5 and 26 of article 64 of the National Police Disciplinary Regulations, with the aggravating factors stated in subparagraphs (c), (d), and (m) of Article 30 of the same regulations. Such grounds "have a certain scope," which required the sanctioning authority to provide more detailed reasoning that linked the specific facts attributed to the alleged victim to the applied grounds and the imposed sanction. 72. It was indicated that the justification of the Disciplinary Court did not specify how the events in question fell within those grounds, nor was there an assessment made regarding the imposition of the most severe sanction. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the State violated Articles 8(1) and 9 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of the same international instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Mina Cuero. 73. The representatives argued that the Disciplinary Court sanctioned Mr. Mina Cuero by applying regulations that established offenses, which violated "the principle of legal reserve, as only by [l]aw can an act be classified as an offense subjec[t] to sanction," as required by the principle of legality. 74. It was pointed out that the scope of the regulatory rules required a greater level of justification "that linked the facts attributed to the [alleged] victim with the grounds applied and the sanction imposed." It was added that the Disciplinary Court, in imposing the most severe sanction based on Article 30 of the National Police Disciplinary Regulations, did not explain "[w]hat the other circumstance [were] that increa[sed] the seriousness of the offense or the dangerousness of the accused party." 75. The State indicated that the inter-American standard that requires, in terms of justification, "the expression of reasoned justification to reach a conclusion" was fulfilled in Mr. Mina Cuero's process in two ways. First, through the justified investigation report of the Commander of the First District of the National Police, and then by the Resolution issued by the Disciplinary Court, considering and taking into account the various elements at its disposal, including the investigation report as well as the procedural and factual records of the hearing. 76. It was noted that the analysis conducted by the Disciplinary Court determined that the alleged victim had committed "a disciplinary offense[,] not only for contravening the provisions of an unauthorized transfer but mainly for verbally assaulting fellow police officers." A.4. Right to appeal the judgment 77. The Commission indicated that the State argued that the alleged victim had the remedy of appeal available to challenge the imposed sanction. In this regard, Article 67 of the Law on Personnel of the National Police provided for the appeal as the means by which anyone who considered themselves "illegally dismissed" could challenge the dismissal. Furthermore, Article 84 of the Regulations on Discipline of the National Police regulated that sanctions "imposed by the Disciplinary Court" could not be appealed. In the face of this "apparent