19. The principle has a material aspect, which means that no one can be punished twice for the same act, as long as there is an identity of subject, act, and legal basis, meaning that the same wrongful content is present, that is, the violation of the same legal right or protected interest. In other words, according to the sustained interpretation, the basis of both sanctions must be identical. 20. It is worth noting that, in this case, from a harmonious reading of the cited Articles 30 and 64, the aggravating circumstance refers to the act being carried out in the presence of personnel, in such a way that it can be considered a bad example in maintaining order and discipline, while the offense attributed to the alleged victim consists of committing any act that reveals a lack of consideration and respect towards a superior. From my point of view, the constitutive element refers exclusively to acts of insubordination towards superiors. In contrast, the aggravating circumstance is configured by the presence, at the time of commission, of personnel other than superiors, with regard to whom the offense could be considered a bad example. In my view, the alteration of responsibility consists of aggravating the act based on something not foreseen in the basic offense, as the lack of consideration and respect towards a superior could have been committed without the presence of other personnel. The position I uphold on the non-violation of the principle ne bis in idem both in a case of aggravation, as in the present study, in no way implies a distancing or reversal from this Court’s constant case law in the assessment, interpretation, and application of the principle.8 V. CONCLUSIONS 1) Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights are justiciable directly before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as Human Rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent, and their violations are interconnected with other rights. 2) Based on such consideration, the reference to Article 26 of the American Convention is a guiding principle that allows access to its definition and content together with the Protocol of San Salvador and the international corpus iuris, but insufficient by itself to justify access to the Court. 3) In this case, the violation of various civil and political rights is simultaneous and indivisible from the violation of the right in question. 4) The simultaneous violation of Article 23(1) (c) of the American Convention is particularly relevant in this case. 8 See Case of Rosadio Villavicencio v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2019. Series C No. 388, paras. 101 and 105; Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merit. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, paras. 66 and 68; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 199; Case of Mohamed v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2012. Series C No. 255, para. 120, and Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013, Series C No. 275, paras. 259 and 267. See also Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No.154, paragraph 154. Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No.162, paragraph 153. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No.251, paragraph 195. Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 162, paragraph 197. 6