15 the assessment of the disputes in this case; it is therefore admitted based on Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure. C) Assessment of the evidence 46. Based on the provisions of Articles 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 57 and 58 of the Rules of Procedure, as well as on its consistent case law concerning evidence and its assessment, the Court will examine and assess the probative elements admitted in the preceding section (supra paras. 40 to 45). To this end, it will abide by the principles of sound judicial discretion, within the corresponding legal framework, and taking into account the whole body of evidence and the arguments submitted during the proceedings. 20 Furthermore, the statements made by the presumed victims will be assessed in the context of all the evidence in the proceedings inasmuch as they can provide further information on the presumed violations and their consequences. 21 VII FACTS 47. In this chapter, the Court will examine, first, the context in which the facts of this case occurred and, then, the proven facts concerning Gladys Espinoza. A) Context in which the facts of the case occurred 48. The Commission and the representatives both affirmed that the facts of this case took place against the background of the conflict in Peru, the indiscriminate violence used by the insurgent groups, and the illegal actions of the security forces, in a context that included the practice of torture, sexual violence and rape in the counterinsurgency efforts, as well as the antiterrorism laws enacted starting in 1992, the effects of the latter on the institutionalization of such practices and the impunity in which they were maintained. The State did not contest the context presented by the Commission and the representatives in its answering brief. 22 Moreover, it indicated that the facts of this case took place in a context characterized by the situation of unparalleled violence created by the terrorist organizations at the time, the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), whose acts of violence resulted in the loss of lives and property, in addition to the moral harm caused by the general situation of permanent unrest to which Peruvian society was subjected. Specifically, it referred to the MRTA as one of the armed groups that, during this period of extreme violence in Peru, had carried out numerous subversive attacks. In the case of the MRTA, abduction and extortion were the main methods used to obtain money to fund its subversive activities, and these crimes were carried out by the so-called “Special Forces,” composed of elite militants within the organization. Furthermore, hostage-taking and abductions for political and/or financial purposes that could be attributed to the MRTA had a particular impact on Peruvian society. The State also referred to specific cases of abduction that could be attributed to the MRTA. In its final arguments, the State presented observations on the evidence provided by the Commission and the representatives regarding the alleged context in this case. 20 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37 para. 76, and Case of Tarazona Arrieta et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 28. 21 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 43, and Case of Tarazona Arrieta et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 28. 22 The State indicated in its brief with final arguments that “the truth regarding the alleged generalized pattern of sexual violence in the context of the detention of women who were prosecuted and/or convicted of the crime of terrorism” should be questioned because, in previous cases before the Court, such as those of Loayza Tamayo, Castillo Petruzzi, De la Cruz Flores, and Lori Berenson, all against Peru, “the existence of such acts was not alleged.” The Court considers that this observation is time-barred, since it was submitted for the first time in the State’s final written arguments.