17 A.1. The conflict in Peru 51. In previous cases, the Court has recognized that, starting in the early 1980s and until the end of 2000, Peru experienced a conflict between armed groups and members of the Police and the Armed Forces. 32 This conflict was exacerbated by a systematic practice of human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances of persons suspected of belonging to the insurgent groups. These practices were perpetrated by State agents on the orders of military and police commanders. 33 52. The Court has indicated that the suffering that Shining Path caused to Peruvian society is widely and publicly known. 34 Meanwhile, the actions of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (hereinafter “the MRTA”) were characterized by the “taking” of radio stations, schools, markets and poor neighborhoods; the theft of the distribution trucks of well-known commercial companies, assaults on trucks full of basic goods, attacks on companies that provided water and electricity, attacks on police posts and the homes of members of the Government, the selective assassination of senior public officials and businessmen, the execution of indigenous leaders, and some murders based on the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity, the latter in a series of terrorist acts that continued for a long time. In addition, journalists and businessmen were abducted in order to obtain large sums of money for their release. During their captivity, the hostages were concealed in the so-called “people’s prisons” (small, unhealthy spaces). 53. The CVR stressed that, among the acts that can be attributed to the MRTA, hostagetaking and abductions for political and/or financial reasons had a particular impact on Peruvian society, owing to the way and the conditions in which they were carried out. The evidence obtained by the CVR allowed it to conclude that, between 1984 and 1996, the MRTA carried out dozens of individual and collective abductions for purposes of extortion. 35 From 1988 to 1995, this became a systematic practice that reached its climax in 1992. Sixty-five per cent of the abductions occurred in Lima. Abductions for financial reasons accounted for 66% of the total, while only 9% of abductions were for political reasons, and 14% of the cases were based on both financial and political reasons. One of the organizational components of the MRTA was the Revolutionary Military Force, which was made up of “elite units” known as “Special Forces.” In this regard, the CVR indicated that, once the MRTA had decided who would be a victim of abduction, the members of the Special Forces studied that person’s daily activities carefully. Usually, at least four individuals took part in the abductions, and they were armed with submachine guns, FAL or AKM rifles, short-range weapons, steel ropes, and hammers. In some cases they used ski-masks, while in others they wore similar clothing to members of the National Police or to medical personnel so as not to arouse suspicion among passers-by. The abductions took place in the victims’ home, in their workplace, or on streets or other public places. A.2. The states of emergency, the anti-terrorism laws, and also the coup d’état of April 5, 1992 32 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, supra, para. 197.1, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 57. 33 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 46, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 59. 34 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Interpretation of judgment on merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 2, 2008. Series C No. 181, para. 41, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 60. 35 The practice of carrying out abductions began in 1984; no cases were recorded during the next two years, but starting in 1989 the number gradually increased, with a slight decrease in 1988, 1989 and 1990. In 1993, the practice began to decrease considerably until 1994, when no case was recorded. Finally, in 1995, it began again and then decreased again, until it concluded definitively in 1996.