38 hearing, the Commission argued that, as in the Case of J. v. Peru, the State had “raised the issue of [a state of] emergency for the first time” before the Court; thus, while the petition was being processed, it was unaware that the State’s justification for the way in which the arrest had been carried out was a state of emergency. It also indicated that this gave rise to the possibility of a situation of estoppel, because the Commission had adopted a substantive and procedural position in the Merits Report, based on the fact that the State’s arguments had made no reference to a state of emergency. It also argued that, when the State cites a state of emergency, it has the burden of proving why it was necessary to apply the restrictions that were in force under the state of emergency, and it has not done so in this case. Consequently, the Commission considered that the restrictions concerning the ability to make an arrest without a court order and in the absence of a situation of in flagrante delicto, and for longer than provided for by law should be analyzed in detail and individually in keeping with the specific case, and should not be dismissed owing to the generic existence of a state of emergency. It also indicated that the generic citing of “permanent flagrante delicto” should be considered exceptional and respect the guarantees required in cases of detention. It also stressed that the State had not presented any kind of documentary evidence to support its argument, but rather based itself on documents prepared after the victim’s arrest. Lastly, in its final written observations, the Commission considered that the victim’s arrest was unlawful. b) Non-compliance with the guarantees established in Article 7(4) of the Convention, because the DIVISE agents who arrested the presumed victim did not record her detention. In those circumstances, the Commission concluded that the presumed victim had not been notified promptly of the reasons for her detention. It added that the State had not presented any record that proved compliance with the said guarantees, but had merely identified a document dated after the presumed victim’s arrest in which she indicated that she had been informed of the reasons for her detention. In this regard, it observed that the victim’s statement in that document did not specify when she was notified of the reasons for her detention. In addition, the Commission argued that the detention was arbitrary because the State had not argued that it was strictly necessary and proportionate for the State agents to make the arrest using blows, insults and threats, taking into consideration the standards that regulate the use of force. c) Non-compliance with the provisions of Article 7(5) of the Convention, and also Article 7(3), because the detention of Gladys Espinoza became arbitrary, contrary to this instrument, because, following her arrest on April 17, 1993, she remained incommunicado for several days and was only brought before a judicial authority of the military jurisdiction on June 24, 1993, eighty days after her arrest. The Commission also indicated that Peru had not explained why, in Gladys Espinoza’s case, the guarantee of judicial control had been suspended, and emphasized that the State’s argument that Gladys Espinoza Gonzáles was brought before a judge within 30 days “has no relevance for the analysis of the case” because, in numerous judgments and even in the Case of J. v. Peru, “the Court has maintained that the absence of judicial control, even for the 15 days established by domestic law at that time, violates the right established in Article 7(5) of the American Convention.” Lastly, the Commission argued that, from the time of the presumed victim’s arrest until November 25 that year, article 6 of Decree Law No. 25,659 prohibited the presentation of an application for habeas corpus in favor of individuals involved in proceedings for terrorism or treason, which is contrary to Article 7(6) of the Convention. 104. The representatives presented similar arguments to those of the Commission and added that the arrest of Gladys Espinoza and the detention regime to which she was subjected were characterized by numerous irregularities that constituted gross violations of the guarantees established in Article 7 of the Convention. They indicated that these violations took place in a context that, at the time, was characterized by the generalization of arbitrary detentions and investigations of individuals accused of terrorism, which is relevant to the analysis, above all, because it was sought to shield the actions of the State agents during the detention of Gladys