69 the right of every detainee to the respect dye to the dignity inherent in the human being. 323 State must also ensure that those deprived of liberty may contact the members of their family. 324 The Court recalls that incommunicado is an exceptional measures to ensure the results of an investigation, and that that it can only be applied if it is ordered in keeping with conditions that have been established previously by law. 325 187. The Court considers that the fact that Ms. Espinoza had no access to her family for approximately three weeks constituted a prolonged period of incommunicado. In addition, the Court has already established that the detention of Ms. Espinoza Gonzáles was unlawful (supra para. 137). In this regard, the Court has indicated that even if an unlawful detention has only lasted for a short time, this is sufficient for it to constitute a violation of mental and moral integrity, in accordance with the standards of international human rights law and, in these circumstances, it is possible to infer, even when there is no other evidence in this regard, that the treatment that the victim received during her time of incommunicado was inhuman and degrading. 326 Therefore, this time of incommunicado constituted a violation of Article 5(2) and 5(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of Gladys Espinoza. 188. Lastly, in order to establish whether the above-mentioned acts inflicted on Gladys Espinoza on the premises of the DIVISE and of the DINCOTE in April and May 1993, constituted acts of torture, the Court will determine whether these acts: (i) were intentional; (ii) caused severe physical or mental suffering, and (ii) were committed with an objective or purpose (supra paras. 179 to 182). 189. In view of its nature, repetition and duration over time, the Court finds it evident that the physical and psychological abuse suffered by Gladys Espinoza, including being beaten on all parts of her body, suspended by her hands and immersed in fetid water, and receiving death threats against herself and her family, was intentional. Regarding the severity of her suffering, the Court recalls that, in her statements, Ms. Espinoza indicated that she heard her partner crying out in pain, that she fainted on several occasions, that she felt that she was abandoning her body because she had “gone beyond the limits of pain,” and that she asked her captors to kill her (supra para. 159). In this regard, the Court notes that the psychologist Carmen Wurst identified the loss of consciousness and the depersonalization as protective systems deployed in the face of such acts (supra para. 169). Lastly, with regard to the objective, the said acts were perpetrated against Ms. Espinoza in the context of a situation in which the agents of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE interrogated her repeatedly concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Furukawa following his abduction (supra paras. 158 and 159). Without rejecting the possible existence of other objectives, the Court finds that, in this case, it has been proved that the physical and psychological violence inflicted had the specific objective of obtaining information on the MRTA and the presumed abduction mentioned above, as well as to punish her for not providing the information requested. 190. With regard to the acts of a sexual nature perpetrated against Ms. Espinoza while on the premises of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE, the Court recalls, as the Convention of Belém do Pará indicates, that violence against women not only constitutes a violation of human rights, but is “an offense against human dignity and a manifestation of the historically unequal power 323 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, supra, para. 87, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 376. 324 Cf. Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 376. See also, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Communications Nos. 222/98 and 229/99 (2003), para. 44. 325 326 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 89, Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 378. Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, supra, para. 98, and Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, supra, para. 87.