21 66. Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Court concludes that there is no evidence that the State may have disregarded the right of the victims to have a hearing before an impartial tribunal, but it has been indeed shown that its legislation (supra para. 59) and its case law (supra para. 61) prevented them from requesting the review of the impartiality of the body trying them. To put it a different way, non-compliance with the duty to respect the right has not been shown, but rather that guarantee thereof is lacking. 67. Based on all of the foregoing, the Tribunal declares the State to have failed to guarantee the right of the victims to a hearing before an impartial tribunal, something that is in violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. 4. Right to a hearing 68. The Commission indicated that the CPAM decided that the judges of the First Court had incurred in an inexcusable judicial error “without first allowing them to submit [to such Chamber] the arguments showing the reasonableness of the decision adopted.” 69. The representative coincided with the Commission and added that the CPAM “did not allow [the alleged victims] to attach recent case law by that [same Chamber], wherein [the] decision [of the First Court, on the case which had been removed from it] was sustained.” He argued, furthermore, that the judges of the First Court “were not parties” in the case removed from their jurisdiction. 70. The State pointed out that “when some of the [STJ] Chambers with competent jurisdiction hear a judgment delivered by a lower court that they themselves have removed, no subjective opinion is formed which might amount to prejudice on disciplinary aspects concerning the judges” but rather “an objective one leading to interrupt the normal course of the proceedings in the case under consideration by such lower courts.” 71. In the proceedings before CPAM wherein the request to remove the case thereto was determined (supra paras. 32 and 33) the parties were the Registradora Subalterna del Primer Circuito del Municipio Baruta del Estado Miranda [First Circuit Junior Registrar in the Baruta Township of Miranda State], in her capacity as the one requesting the removal of the case to the upper court, and the attorney-at-law for the person who had brought the action on precautionary amparo before the First Court.80 The judges of the First Court were not parties to such proceedings. 72. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Convention, the right to a hearing requires every person to be able to have access to the state body or tribunal in charge of determining his rights and obligations. 73. In this regard, the Court underscores that, in the proceedings for the removal of the case to the upper court, no right or obligation of the judges delivering the ruling under revision is determined.81 Besides, pursuant to the Judiciary Career Act, an inexcusable judicial error may not only be declared in proceedings seeking a case transfer to an upper court, but in any other proceeding in appeal or whereby any 80 81 Cf. judgment No. 809 of May 29, 2003 issued by the CPAM, supra note 38, p. 1007. Cf. article 42 of the Supreme Court of Justice Organic Law, supra note 32, and article 18 of the STJ Organic Law, supra note 31.