24 [Inspector General of Courts] stated that the investigation he had conducted consisted “simply in procuring the judgment by the First Court;” that the IGC “has neither the powers nor the jurisdiction to analyze the decisions […] of the [CPAM] from a legal standpoint,” for which reason the value as evidence of the decisions concerning the inexcusable judicial error by the CPAM “is complete” to the effect of pronouncing the respective accusation; and that the accusation he effected against judges of the First Court was self-explanatory, once the judgment originating the inception of the proceedings was attached.87 83. Moreover, even though in the Resolution of October 30, 2003, the CORJS transcribed the victims’ arguments, in assessing and establishing disciplinary responsibility it merely summarized the considerations expressed by the CPAM in its finding of inexcusable judicial error mentioned above.88 Accordingly, in response to the victims’ argument that no constitutive precautionary measure which denatures the essence of precautionary amparo had been ordered, the CORJS noted that this “was settled by the decision of the [CPAM…], which, for [the CORJS], constitutes the validity requirement for a decision in this disciplinary sphere,” and that “such conduct, reflected in the judicial decision, has far-reaching disciplinary significance when it takes the form of an error that is inconceivable on the part of the [judges of the First Court] because of the absurdity of the decision’s effects.”89 84. In this regard, the Court will emphasize the fact that international law has developed guidelines on the valid grounds for the suspension or removal of a judge, which may include, among others, misconduct or incompetence.90 However, judges cannot be removed on the sole ground that one of their decisions has been overturned on appeal or review by a higher judicial body.91 This safeguards the independence of judges internally, since they should not feel compelled to avoid dissenting with the reviewing body which, basically, only plays a distinct judicial role that is limited to dealing with the issues raised on appeal by a party who is dissatisfied with the original decision. 87 Cf. testimony by Mr. Servio Tulio León Briceño before the Inter-American Court in the public hearing celebrated on January 31, 2008. The witness also pointed out the following: “I think that the conclusive act and the accusation made before the [CORJS] is self-explanatory, it is done, the judgment is attached, and that is how the proceedings are instituted. And I think that justifications or reasons were redundant in the judgment. However the consequences of the act that justified, in fact, commencement of the proceedings that was the judgment, were indeed analyzed, even though the judgment does not say it; no grounds that I remember were omitted.” 88 The CORJS stated that “[the] judgment of the [CPAM] expressly declared that the First Court [committed] a serious, inexcusable judicial error” and that “[i]n its decision, the [STJ] considers that [the relief sought by the petitioner] does not constitute the reestablishment of an infringed legal situation, but the creation of a new situation, which is foreign and contrary to the nature of constitutional amparo [… with] the potential harm that this could cause […] to the rights of possible future purchasers of those lands [being more serious].” The CORJS held that “a constitutional amparo is not a proper judicial remedy to secure registration of a given document […] and because of this material reason, in combination with all other reasons explained herein, the action of the judges of the First Court […|, in the terms of the precautionary ruling, constitutes a serious inexcusable error that has been recognized as such by the [CPAM].” Cf. CORJS resolution of October 30, 2003, supra note 49, pp. 1084 to 1086. 89 Cf. CORJS resolution of October 30, 2003, supra note 49, p. 1087. 90 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, supra note 58, para. 20. See also Principle 18 of the Basic Principles of the United Nations, supra note 59. 91 In this regard, see Principle A, para. 4 (n) 2 of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted as part of the African Commission’s activity report at 2nd Summit and Meeting of Heads of State of the African Union, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from July 4 to July 12, 2003.