32 For such reasons, and based on the available evidence, the lack of independence of the Judiciary, in general, has not been proven before this Court. 6.2. Independence of the CORJS 109. The Commission argued that the instant case involved a “misuse of power,” which took place because of the use of “formally valid procedures –the disciplinary investigation of the victims- as mechanisms for achieving undeclared ends.” In this regard, the Commission stated that “the disciplinary procedure was used as a tool to remove judges that were a part of the majority in the First Court […] who had issued decisions that were contrary to the administration.” It then argued that “indicia as a whole support the inference that there was a cause-and-effect relationship between the statements of the President of the Republic and senior government officials concerning decisions that went against government interests and the disciplinary investigation that was initiated and that culminated in the victims’ removal.” 110. The representative argued that “[b]ecause the Government was unable to control the content of the First Court’s rulings, it chose to find a way to remove the judges. The victims’ removal […] was used as a political tool to illegitimately interfere with the independent exercise of the powers and duties of the judges of the First Court,” since the CORJS merely “executed an order received, either expressly or tacitly, from the President of the Republic.” 111. The State maintained that the evidence submitted by the petitioners is insufficient “to conclusively verify the existence of an instance of abuse of power against [the J]udiciary so that it would remove the alleged victims.” 112. There are eleven judgments of the First Court, which according to the Commission and the representative, are the true reason behind the removal of the judges of that court. Ten of those judgments were rendered between August 2002 and August 2003. Through them, the First Court respectively allowed an amparo against a military air base that was keeping a helicopter from taking-off in the context of large marching demonstrations and mass gatherings in the city of Caracas;120 suspended the proceedings against Army generals by investigation councils;121 declared the eviction of a General from his home, on the orders of an Army General Commander, unconstitutional;122 allowed an amparo aimed at demilitarizing a State in which Army and National Guard officers were deployed;123 ordered that the Mayor of Caracas be allowed to enter the Metropolitan Police Department premises, which were under military control;124 suspended the requisitioning, by the National Guard and other administrative agencies, of products 120 Cf. judgment No. 2326 of August 20, 2002 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Book III, Annex B.1.a, pp. 771 to 799). 121 Cf. judgment No. 3034 of October 31, 2002 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Book III, Annex B.1.b, pp. 801 to 813), and judgment No. 3043 of November 6, 2002 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Annex B.1.c, pp. 815 to 829). 122 Cf. judgment No. 3116 of November 11, 2002 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Book III, Annex B.1.d, pp. 831 to 852). 123 Cf. judgment No. 3278 of November 25, 2002 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Book III, Annex B.1.e, pp. 854 to 861). 124 Cf. judgment No. 01 of January 7, 2003 issued by the First Court (Evidence file, Book III, Annex B.1.f, pp. 863 to 877).