Limitations to rights 9. Article 29(d) of the Convention establishes that “No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as […] excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” Consequently, Article XXVIII of the Declaration is applicable, according to which “The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the advancement of democracy.” 10. Specifically, in relation to freedom of thought and expression, Article 13(2) of the Convention establishes the following: 2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a) b) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. In other words, in the case of freedom of thought and expression there are specific limits that – respecting the requirements that it is “subject to subsequent imposition of liability” “expressly established by law” – explicitly establish the need to ensure “respect for the rights or reputations of others.” Meanwhile, the Convention does not include any provision that establishes specific limits to the right to honor or reputation and to dignity. Moreover, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which the exercise or enjoyment of this right could affect another right, in a way that would entail the application of the general limitation indicated in paragraph 8. 11. Nevertheless, in its previous judgments, the Court has understood that in certain precisely defined cases, the right to honor must cede to freedom of thought and expression, owing to the importance of the latter for a democratic society. In the following paragraphs, the elements that, in specific circumstances (which, as will be seen, are not present in the instant case) entail the prevalence of one right over the other are analyzed. The weighing up between the two rights 12. The Court initiated its reasoning by proclaiming the equivalence of the two rights and the need to weigh them and to harmonize them. For example, in one case it stated the following: The Court recognizes that both freedom of thought and expression and the right to have one’s honor respected, as enshrined by the Convention, are fundamental rights. It is, therefore, imperative to ensure the exercise of both. In this regard, the prevalence of either of them in a particular case will depend on the considerations made as to proportionality. The solution to the conflict arising between some rights requires examining each case in accordance with its specific characteristics and circumstances, considering the existence of elements and the extent thereof on which the considerations regarding proportionality are to be based. 5 And, further on in the same judgment, it stipulated: 5 Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51. 3