this by the delays caused by the procedural transition owing to the entry into force of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure on July 1, 1999 (supra para. 90). However, in this case, the Court has verified that there were some procedural delays that, in the Court’s opinion, are not justified by this transitory regime. For example, there were delays that can be attributed mainly to the judicial activities, as well as several previously established errors and omissions in several procedures that can be attributed to the Technical Unit of the Judicial Police, omissions in the autopsy and in the collection of evidence (supra paras. 230 to 235). In this regard, the Court notes that the indictment dates from May 21, 1998, and that, on September 28, 1998, the proceeding to receive reports (acto de informes) was held, following which and before the entry into force of the new procedural regime, the case was ready for judgment to be pronounced. 318 Despite this, the Second Court delivered judgment in first instance on October 13, 2000. 248. Then, the Sixth Court referred the case to the Second Transitory Court on October 11, 2000, “two days” before the adoption of the first instance judgment. However, the Inter-American Court has verified that, following the proceeding to receive reports and until the transfer of the case file to the Second Court, there is no record in the case file of the collection of new evidence or of the implementation of significant procedures; or of procedures carried out before or after the entry into force of the new regime. Consequently, the Court does not find that the period of procedural inactivity is justified by the entry into force of the new procedural regime as indicated by the State (supra para. 213). In addition, The State indicated during the public hearing in this case that the proceedings could still be inconclusive, since the possibility existed of filing domestic remedies (supra para. 16). Lastly, the Court does not find it necessary to analyze the fourth element for the purposes of this case. 319 249. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State failed to respect a reasonable time in relation to the investigation and the criminal proceedings with regard to the death of Igmar Landaeta, in violation of Article 8 of the American Convention. B.2.3 Conclusion with regard to Igmar Landaeta 250. The Court concludes that, with regard to the investigations and the criminal proceedings instituted for the death of Igmar Landaeta, the State did not conduct an exhaustive and diligent investigation, following joint lines of investigation in relation to the death of his brother Eduardo Landaeta, that would have allowed sufficient consistent, congruent and reliable technical evidence to be obtained in order to resolve the contradictory positions assumed by the judicial authorities, which had a relevant impact on the obstruction of the clarification of the events in the domestic jurisdiction, and on the determination of the corresponding responsibilities. The Court also concludes that the State did not provide an effective judicial remedy to the members of Igmar Landaeta’s family, owing to the existence of several procedural delays in the prosecution of the case, as well as the failure to make a complete and thorough analysis and to provide comprehensive reasoning as regards the necessity and proportionality of the actions of the agents in compliance with a duty or in exercise of legitimate defense, in order to clarify the events and to punish those responsible as pertinent. Consequently, the Court finds that the State is internationally responsible for the violation of the rights established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of the members of Igmar Landaeta’s family (infra para. 294). B.3 Due diligence and reasonable time during the investigations and the criminal proceedings regarding the death of Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías 318 Article 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that “[w]hen the proceeding to receive reports has concluded, the case shall enter the sentencing stage.” 319 Cf. Case of Garibaldi, supra, para. 138, and Case of Luna López, supra, para. 195. 68