4 the other hand, the declaration of acknowledgment to which it refers, precisely, Article 62(1) of the American Convention. The question regarding whether it is appropriate to keep in this treaty the empowering clause or adopt a regime of automatic acknowledgment is an issue lege ferenda which we shall not examine now. 10. Obviously, the Court may not take on, following its own decision, jurisdiction that has not been conferred upon it. This is about a legal issue that must receive a legal answer, regardless of any particular opinion on the convenience or inconvenience of taking on jurisdiction to hear facts that has no knowledge of, in an act of "judicial authority" that may not have legal grounds and may be, as a result, arbitrary. The Court cannot replace, at will – beyond the boundaries of admissible interpretation -the act of the State in matters that correspond to the decision of the State and not to the powers of the Court. 11. We accept, without any doubt, the authority of the principle pro homine or pro persona in the creation of laws and judicial interpretation within the sphere of human rights which is as essential element for the proper protection of human rights and the progress of case-law in the application of such rules. Hence, the application of this crucial principle has nothing to do in the issue of the case at hand, due to the fact that we are trying to establish here the powers of the jurisdictional body which was created and developed by an international treaty, and not exercise the powers already vested in it by said treaty. 12. Apart from the personal considerations, which are truly respectable, the truth is that the American Convention has created a precise system of recognition of jurisdiction. Certainly, a State may acknowledge the contentious jurisdiction of the Court during the process of a proceeding, expressing such acknowledgment by means of a sufficient and unequivocal action. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty shall be interpreted “… in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (Art. 31(1)), criterion that if applied to this case refers to the rule of the American Convention in which the parties agree to the requirement of an express declaration in order to recognize the competence of the Court. The Court may not assume the existence of such recognition, deducing it from isolated, ambiguous or equivocal expressions, to which the State does not clearly ascribe the nature and efficacy of recognition.