199. The State also noted that jus cogens norms did not have absolute hierarchy over procedural matters. 200. Consequently the State affirmed that: (a) legally, it was not possible to require the domestic authorities to adopt a decision other than the one adopted in 1993 with regard to the investigations; (b) disputing the domestic decision based on subsequent international jurisprudence did not take into consideration the formal limits applicable to due process of law (such as substantive res judicata); (c) abiding by procedural norms of a lower rank in cases of what could be considered jus cogens norms or serious human rights violations was not substantially different from the observance, at the domestic level, of the formal limits to a judge’s actions (statute of limitations, res judicata, non-retroactivity of the more severe criminal law), and (d) the normative content of what could be considered a jus cogens norm or serious human rights violations should not be confused with an absence of limits to the State’s international responsibility. Based on the above, the Brazilian State understood that it could not be held responsible for the supposed denial of justice in this case. 201. The guarantee of the statute of limitations was a mainstay of the democratic rule of law and could only be excluded, exceptionally: (a) for the criminal prosecution of certain crimes, where applying a statute of limitations would infringe upon their gravity or complexity; (b) by a legal provision, owing to adherence to the rule of law in criminal matters, and (c) for facts subsequent to the law that determined their imprescriptibility, owing to the principle of the priority of the criminal law, something which, in the State’s opinion, had not occurred in this case. 202. The State acknowledged the Court’s case law which considered that crimes were imprescriptible when they constituted “gross violations of human rights.” However, the State dissented from that opinion because it made sense in the international criminal jurisdiction, which functioned in an ancillary way - especially when the State that bore the main responsibility did not exercise its jurisdiction effectively - and therefore exercised its jurisdiction at a much later date than when the facts occurred. It emphasized that none of the treaties signed by Brazil imposed on domestic criminal proceedings the obligation to prolong the statutory limitations. 203. According to the State, the imprescriptibility of a crime could not be based on international custom as that would be contrary to the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention. 204. Regarding the crime of torture, the State indicated that this crime had been defined in domestic law in 1997, by Law No. 9455/97. Accordingly, the criminal prosecution of this crime could only be initiated after that law’s entry into force. The State argued that any other understanding would violate the principles of legality and non-retroactivity. 205. In relation to the alleged violation of the American Convention owing to an unjustified delay and obstacles that occurred in the context of the civil action, the State considered that the requests should be divided into two groups: those that involved rights guaranteed in the American Convention, and those that involved rights that were not included. Regarding the first group, the State considered that the context in which Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra and Audir Santos Maciel, responsible for the crimes of torture, were summoned to testify did not correspond to the civil jurisdiction, because the summons should have been issued in the criminal jurisdiction following a criminal investigation. In the case of the second group of requests, it indicated that the Convention recognized civil and political rights exclusively for individuals who had been or could be identified, and not for corporations, public entities, groups of people, etc. In this regard, the subject of both the supposed collective non-pecuniary 42