3 individuals to the Court itself (jus standi), so as to bring a case directly before it, as the sole future jurisdictional organ for the settlement of concrete cases under the American Convention (...) (...) Above all, this qualitative advance would fulfill, in my understanding, an imperative of justice. Individuals’ unrestricted jus standi -no longer merely locus standi in judiciobefore the Inter-American Court itself, represents, -as I have indicated in my Opinions in other cases before the Court-5 the logical consequence of the conception and formulation of rights to be protected under the American Convention at [the] international level, to which it ought to correspond necessarily the full juridical capacity of the individual petitioners to vindicate them. (paragraphs 42-43). 8. The Court’s Judgment in the Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” underscores the fact that each individual is the subject (titulaire) of human rights (para. 106); in other words, in the cas d'espèce, each child victimized by the suffering at the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” is the subject (titulaire) of human rights; not to admit that fact would “unduly restrict their status as subjects of the International Law of Human Rights" (para. 125). Again, I repeat, despite the adversities that the inmates at the "Panchito López" “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” were forced to endure -adversities as extreme as three fires (that killed, burned or otherwise injured inmates at the Center)6- and despite the fact that their existential condition as children (minors) limited their juridical capacity-, their subjectivity of rights emanating directly from international law has been preserved intact and their case has reached an international human rights court. 9. In its Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002 (August 28, 2002) on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, the Court addressed the duties that family and State alike have vis-à-vis children in light of children’s rights under the American Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. But the Court also made plain the fact that a child is the subject (titulaire) of rights, and not simply an object of protection. The Court further held that the Law accords juridical personality to every human being (child and adolescent included), irrespective of his existential condition or of his juridical capacity to exercise his rights for himself (capacity of exercise). 10. As I noted in my Concurring Opinion on Advisory Opinion No. 17: It is true that juridical personality and capacity are closely related. At the conceptual level, however, they are distinct from each other. It may occur that an individual may have juridical personality without enjoying, as a result of his existential condition, full capacity to act. Thus, in the present context, one understands by personality the aptitude to be titulaire of rights and duties, and by capacity the aptitude to exercise them by oneself (capacity of exercise). Capacity is thus closely linked to personality; nevertheless, if by any situation or circumstance an individual does not enjoy full juridical capacity, this does not mean that he ceases to be a subject of right[s]. Such is the case with the children (para. 8). 5 Cf., in this regard, my Separate Opinions in Castillo Páez (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 30, 1996, paragraphs 14-17) and Loayza Tamayo (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 31, 1996), paragraphs 14-17, respectively. 6 Nine inmates died as a result of the fire on February 11, 2000; nine inmates were injured or burned in the fire on February 5, 2001; and new disturbances broke out in the fire on July 25, 2001 (cf. paragraph 134.29-34 of the present Judgment).