9 example, in the case of Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama (Judgment of February 2, 2001, paragraphs 124-127), where the Court observes that, ultimately, justice done through due process of law, as a “legally protected true value,” must be ensured (para. 129). As I see it, the broad scope of due process of law follows from its close relationship to the right to effective recourse (lato sensu) to a competent court or tribunal. 27. The latter concept is expressed in Article 25 of the American Convention. In my Dissenting Opinion in Genie Lacayo vs. Nicaragua (Application for judicial review of the Judgment of January 29, 1997. Order of the Court of September 13, 1997), I underscored the sense and scope of Article 25 of the American Convention in the following terms: The right to a simple, prompt and effective remedy before the competent national judges or tribunals, enshrined in Article 25 of the Convention, is a fundamental judicial guarantee far more important than one may prima facie assume,22 and which can never be minimized. It constitutes, ultimately, one of the basic pillars not only of the American Convention on Human Rights, but of the rule of law (État de Droit) itself in a democratic society (in the sense of the Convention). Its correct application has the sense of improving the administration of justice at national level, with the legislative changes necessary to the attainment of that purpose. The origin - little-known - of that judicial guarantee is Latin American: from its insertion originally in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (of April 1948),23 it was transplanted to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of December 1948), and from there to the European and American Conventions on Human Rights (Articles 13 and 25, respectively), as well as to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2(3)). Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular, it has generated a considerable case-law,24 apart from a dense doctrinal debate. (paragraphs 18-19). 28. The Inter-American Court has recognized the importance of the right to effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal; from the time of its Judgment in Castillo Páez vs. Peru (November 3, 1997) (paragraph 82) to the present, the Court has repeatedly held that every individual’s right to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights (Article 25 of the Convention) "is one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention but also of the rule of law itself in a democratic society, within the 22 . Its importance was pointed out, for example, in the Report of the Commission of Jurists of the OAS for Nicaragua, of February 4, 1994, pp. 100 and 106-107, paragraphs 143 and 160 (later published in: 113/118 Boletim da Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Internacional (1998), pp. 335-386). 23 At a time when the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations was still in the process of preparing the Draft Universal Declaration (from May 1947 to June 1948), as recalled by the rapporteur of the Commission (René Cassin); the inclusion in the Universal Declaration of the provision on the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals (Article 8), inspired by the counterpart provision of the American Declaration (Article XVIII), took place in the subsequent debates (of 1948) of the III Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Cf. R. Cassin, "Quelques souvenirs sur la Déclaration Universelle de 1948", 15 Revue de droit contemporain (1968) n. 1, p. 10. 24 At its beginnings, such case-law sustained the "accessory" character of Article 13 of the European Convention, seen - as from the eighties - as guaranteeing a subjective individual substantive right. Gradually, in its judgments in the cases of Klass versus Germany (1978), Silver and Others versus United Kingdom (1983), and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali versus United Kingdom (1985), the European Court of Human Rights began to recognize the autonomous character of Article 13. Finally, after years of hesitation and oscillations, the European Court, in its recent judgment, of 18 December 1996, in the case of Aksoy versus Turkey (paragraphs 95-100), determined the occurrence of an "autonomous" violation of Article 13 of the European Convention.