17 * * * 78. The Commission alleged that the right to liberty of Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo was also violated because they were not “guaranteed a technical defense” and because Mr. Chaparro was not advised of his right to consular assistance, since he was a foreigner. 79. The Court finds that the respective analysis should be made in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, and this will be done in the following chapter (infra paras. 155 to 159 and 162 to 165). c) Duration of the detention 80. The Commission stated that the two victims were brought before the judge “23 days after their arrest,” which would be contrary to domestic law and to Article 7(5) of the Inter-American Convention. The State declared that there had been “prompt judicial control” of the arrests. 81. The first part of Article 7(5) of the Convention establishes that the detained person must be brought promptly before a judge. Prompt judicial control is a measure intended to avoid arbitrary or unlawful arrests, bearing in mind that, under the rule of law, the judge is responsible for guaranteeing the rights of the detained person, authorizing the adoption of precautionary or coercive measures when strictly necessary and, in general, ensuring that the accused is treated in a manner in keeping with the presumption of innocence.42 82. Article 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (supra para. 60) established that detention for investigative purposes could not last more than 48 hours, after which the detained person must be released or criminal proceedings opened. 83. From the evidence provided, it is clear that the victims made a first statement before a prosecutor on November 19, 1997; that is, four days after their arrest, and a statement before the judge on December 11, 1997, 26 days after they had been detained. 84. According to the Court’s case law in other cases relating to the Ecuadorean State, the victims’ statement before the prosecutor cannot be considered to comply with the right to be brought before “a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” embodied in Article 7(5) of the Convention.43 85. Furthermore, the Court does not accept the State’s argument that it had complied with Article 7(5) because the judge in the case was present at the time of the arrests and exercised direct judicial control, suggesting that there was no need to bring the victims before her again. Even though the presence of the judge could be described as an additional guarantee, it was not, by itself, sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Article 7(5) of being “brought” before a judge. The judicial authority must hear the detained person personally and evaluate all the explanations that the latter provides, in order to 42 Cf. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Series C No. 110, para. 96; Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 27, 2003. Series C No. 103, para. 66, and Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 129. 43 Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 119.