19 "[A]rbitrariness" is not to be equated with "against the law", but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. […T]his means that remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances.46 93. In brief, it is not sufficient that every reason for deprivation or restriction of the right to liberty is established by law; this law and its application must respect the requirements listed below, to ensure that this measure is not arbitrary: (i) that the purpose of the measures that deprive or restrict liberty is compatible with the Convention. It is worth indicating that the Court has recognized that ensuring that the accused does not prevent the proceedings from being conducted or evade the judicial system is a legitimate purpose;47 (ii) that the measures adopted are appropriate to achieve the purpose sought; (iii) that they are necessary, in the sense that they are absolutely essential to achieve the purpose sought and that, among all possible measures, there is no less burdensome one in relation to the right involved, that would be as suitable to achieve the proposed objective. Hence, the Court has indicated that the right to personal liberty supposes that any limitation of this right must be exceptional,48 and (iv) that the measures are strictly proportionate,49 so that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to liberty is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages obtained from this restriction and the achievement of the purpose sought. Any restriction of liberty that is not based on a justification that will allow an assessment of whether it is adapted to the conditions set out above will be arbitrary and will thus violate Article 7(3) of the Convention.50 94. Based on the above, the Court will now examine: (1) whether the State violated the right embodied in Article 7(3) of the Convention by the detention of Mr. Lapo, and (b) where the order for the remand in custody of Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo, and its maintenance, were arbitrary. a) The arrest of Mr. Lapo 95. The Commission stated that the arrest of Mr. Lapo was arbitrary because it was made in application of the principle of “grave presumption of responsibility” contained, in its opinion, in Article 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “because the State has not alleged or presented elements that show that he was arrested in flagrante delicto.” The Commission considers that this legal norm is contrary to the Ecuadorean Constitution and the American Convention. The State did not submit specific arguments on this point. 96. The Court notes, first, that the Commission did not demonstrate that the legal provision it mentioned had been applied in this specific case and, second, that Mr. Lapo’s arrest has already been classified as unlawful from the outset, precisely because it was not preceded by a written order of the judge or by flagrante delicto. Any unlawful arrest entails a degree of arbitrariness, but that arbitrariness is subsumed in the examination of 46 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Case of Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, (458/1991), 21 July 1994, Doc. ONU CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.8. 47 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al., supra note 17, para. 90, and Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 111. 48 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 197, and García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 106. 49 Cf. Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C No. 112, para. 228. 50 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas, supra note 48, para. 128.