28 against [him] be repaired.”76 On May 20, 1998, the Superior Court decided to deny the recourse, based on the following considerations: It is not necessary to examine whether the order of remand in custody is admissible when deciding this recourse, because the said order depends on the criterion of the judge who is granted this discretional power by law. […] Examining the proceedings in criminal case #370-97, it can be seen that the case is at the preliminary stage […]. The procedure is not contrary to that established by law and, consequently, no procedural defects are observed […].77 133. This Court has established that it is not enough that such a remedy exists formally, it must be effective; that is, it must provide results or responses to the violations of rights established in the Convention.78 To the contrary, the judicial activity would not signify a real control, but merely a formal or even symbolic procedure that would result in an impairment of the liberty of the individual. Furthermore, an analysis of the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty “must examine the reasons invoked by the complainant and specifically express an opinion on them, in accordance with the parameters established in the Inter-American Convention.”79 134. As can be observed, the Guayaquil Superior Court rejected the recourses filed without ruling on the reasons that, in the opinion of Messrs. Lapo and Chaparro, made their preventive detention unlawful. Moreover, when deciding Mr. Chaparro’s recourse, it expressly indicated that the order of remand in custody was at the discretion of the judge who issued it, suggesting that the said discretionary power could not be controlled by the ad quem. The Court observes that the said decision incurs in the so-called flaw that vitiates the argument, because it takes for granted the element that it should specifically have proved; in other words, its affirms from the start that it is not necessary to examine whether the order of remand in custody is admissible, when this is precisely what was being discussed before that court. In addition, the Superior Court did not rule on whether the preventive detention should be maintained. 135. Lastly, the Court underscores that the Superior Court took 31 days to decide on Mr. Lapo’s recourse, and nine days to decide on the recourse of Mr. Chaparro, which is not compatible with the term “promptly” contained in Article 7(6) of the Convention. 136. Based on the above, the Court considers that the State violated Article 7(6) of the Convention to the detriment of Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo and, therefore, their right to personal liberty embodied in Article 7(1) of the Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee rights embodied in Article 1(1) thereof. * * * 76 Cf. action for judicial protection filed on May 12, 1998, by Juan Carlos Chaparro Álvarez (judicial case file, volume 72, folio 9313). 77 Cf. judgment of May 20, 1998, delivered by the Superior Court of Justice of Guayaquil (judicial case file, volume 72, folio 9316). 78 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 77; Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 40, para. 121, and Case of the “Five Pensioners” v. Peru. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 126. 79 Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 96.