49 this Court, that must identify the alleged victims in a case before the Court precisely and at the appropriate procedural opportunity.155 225. This has not occurred in the instant case and, accordingly, the Court has not declared any violation to the detriment of the next of kin of Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo; hence, they cannot be considered to be an injured party. B) COMPENSATION 226. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damage and the circumstances in which it is in order to compensate this.156 227. In the instant case, the Commission maintained that the victims “were not only deprived of their liberty and ceased working but, in addition, property belonging to them was seized” and this was not returned immediately after their acquittal, but required additional measures to make the return effective, which “caused added financial losses.” The representatives requested that compensation be awarded for pecuniary damage “in the terms described in the expert opinion prepared by Yazmín Kuri Gonzalez.” In addition, during the public hearing, the representatives requested that “an appraisal be conducted of the material losses they suffered: in the case of Mr. Chaparro, his factory, and in the case of Mr. Lapo, his vehicle and his house.” The State contested these requests for reparation, arguing that “the alleged victims could file a civil action to claim payment of damages.” a) Pecuniary damage arising from the seizure and deposit of property 228. The Court has established in this judgment that Mr. Chaparro’s shares in the Plumavit factory had a financial value that formed part of his patrimony (supra para. 182). This financial value was directly related to the value of the company itself. The State’s actions, namely the unsatisfactory administration of the property, the delay in the return of the factory, the return of property in a deteriorated condition, and the misplacement of certain property, entailed an impediment to the use and enjoyment of those shares, because the value of the company decreased considerably, and this had an impact on Mr. Chaparro’s patrimony. 229. Based on the above, the Court finds that the State must compensate Mr. Chaparro for the financial losses that the depreciation in the value of the company caused him. 230. However, the only evidence presented on this aspect is the expert appraisal of Yasmín Kuri González (supra para. 36). Regarding this appraisal, the representatives made general references, without defining the amount they are requesting as compensation for this concept and without developing a logical reasoning that would allow the Court to assess the damage effectively caused. Indeed, the representatives submitted this evidence, but did not develop a line of reasoning about the expert appraisal that would allow this Court to understand it and assess it with the rest of the body of evidence, using sound criticism. The Court finds that this reasoning was required 155 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006 Series C No. 148, para. 98, and Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153, para. 29. 156 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 43; Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz, supra note 20, para. 166, and Case of Escué Zapata, supra note 22, para. 132.