34 such as the massacre examined here, might be related to a context of violence and discrimination against indigenous peoples. The pertinence or relation of a certain person to an identifiable collective with certain characteristics, such as that of the indigenous origin of some soldiers, does not prevent that person from acting against persons of that group because of the relationship. 118. It should be recalled that the Court has noted that, Under the “Doctrine of National Security” (1978-1983), the Army identified, among others, the members of the indigenous Mayan population as “internal enemy,” considering that they were or could be the social base of the guerillas […]. As has been pointed out, in its Final Report of June 1999, the CEH explained that the identification between the Mayan communities and the insurgency and the viciousness and indiscrimination by which the “military operations were conducted against hundreds of Mayan communities in the western and north-western of the country, especially between 1981 and 1983,” were supported by traditional racist prejudices.179 119. This case took place during an internal armed conflict in which there were attacks against persons belonging to an indigenous group. While there is no proof that the massacre was planned (supra para. 85), this does not prevent the Court from recognizing the link between the incident and the general situation in which it took place. It has already been stated that the Mayan people were the ethnic group most affected by the violation of human rights committed during the armed confrontation and that the violence directed against it was manifested by different types of acts, including massacres (supra para. 29). While the events of this case occurred during the latter part of the conflict, the Court notes that the CEH, in referring to this case, concluded that the conduct of the soldiers, in approaching the Community indicated “the persistence in the military thinking of identifying the returnees with the guerillas.”180 It should be recalled that, within the established context (supra paras. 27 to 34), the Army had claimed that indigenous persons could be the social base of the guerilla and, therefore, they were placed in the category of “domestic enemy.” The expert Samayoa Pineda, referring to what occurred in this case, stated that what was evident was the “predisposition of the military patrol regarding the Community […] that had the effect of violating the right to life and to personal integrity of a group of indigenous individuals and families whom they considered to be guerrillas.”181 The Court, therefore, concludes that, in the circumstances of this case, the military action that violated the rights to life and to personal integrity were related to discriminatory conceptions of indigenous persons. Thus, the State did not comply with its obligation to respect without discrimination the rights to life and to personal integrity. B.5. Conclusion 120. The Court, therefore, concludes that the State of Guatemala is responsible: (a) for violating Article 4(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with its obligation to respect the rights without discrimination established in Article 1(1), to the detriment of eight persons who were killed at the time of the incident; (b) for violating Article 5(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with the obligation to respect the rights without discrimination established in Article 1(1), to the detriment of 29 persons who were injured in the incident of October 5, 1995, and (c) for violating Article 4(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 19 and with the obligation to respect the rights without discrimination established in Article 1(1), to the detriment of the one girl Case of the Members of the Village of Chichupac and neighboring communities of the Municipality of Rabinal v. Guatemala, supra, para. 251. 180 CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, supra, Illustrative Case No. 3, Xamán Massacre, p. 43. It should be mentioned that, as has been indicated, the State, in litigating this case, stated that it was in favor of considering the findings of the CEH (supra para. 26). 181 Affidavit of the expert Claudia Virginia Samayoa Pineda (evidence on the merits, fs. 661 to 679). 179